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1005 
ONE PERCENT PROCEDURE 
Brooke D. Coleman

 
Abstract: Political rhetoric about the one percent is pervasive, as those with the greatest 
concentrated wealth prosper and the remaining population stagnates. Because of their 
affluence, the one percent exercise disproportionate control over political and economic 
systems. This Article argues that federal civil procedure is similarly a one percent regime. 
The crème de la crème of the bench and bar, along with equally exclusive litigants, often 
engage in high-stakes, complex civil litigation. It is this type of litigation that dominates both 
the elite experience and the public perception of what civil litigation is. This litigation is not 
particularly common, however; while expensive and well known, it is in the minority. Yet 
this litigation and the individuals engaged in it have an incongruent influence on how the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and procedural doctrine develop. They create one percent 
procedure. 
This Article interrogates and connects disparate phenomena related to civil litigation, 
including the recent discovery amendments and the rise of multidistrict litigation. It 
demonstrates that the elite—those who are deeply steeped in complex, high-stakes 
litigation—are setting the agenda and determining the rules for how the entire civil litigation 
game is played. It further argues that the benefits of a one percent procedure system—
notably expertise of the participants—are not worth the costs; indeed, that expertise can be 
detrimental to the design of a civil litigation system. 
As in politics and economics, a system that gives too much control to the one percent 
risks undervaluing and underserving the remaining ninety-nine percent. Using social and 
political science, the Article argues that the homogeneous policymaking of one percent 
procedure creates suboptimal results. The Article concludes that the structures giving rise to 
one percent procedure must be modified and proposes a set of reforms intended to allow the 
ninety-nine percent representation in, and access to, the process of constructing our shared 
civil litigation system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Those in the top one percent of income control over 40% of the 
country’s wealth and take in a quarter of the country’s income.1 The 
effect, many argue, is that the “one percenters” exercise disproportionate 
control over our nation’s economic and political landscape.2 Meanwhile, 
the middle class and the poor, who have much less wealth and political 
access, bear the negative brunt of this distributive reality.
3
 Although 
Occupy Wall Street protesters are gone from the public square, their 
rallying cry that “we are the 99%” continues to dominate political and 
social discourse.
4
 
                                                     
1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 31, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105 [https://perma.cc/NU5E-E55G]. 
But see Chris Matthews, The Myth of the 1% and the 99%, FORTUNE MAGAZINE (Mar. 2, 2015, 
10:50 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/03/02/economic-inequality-myth-1-percent-wealth/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z7VQ-8S24] (arguing that the wealth disparity depicted by the ninety-nine versus one 
percent is much more fluid that the numbers might otherwise indicate).  
2. Stiglitz, supra note 1. 
3. Id. 
4. The slogan became a part of the movement called Occupy Wall Street, which started in the fall 
of 2011. See John Cassidy, Wall Street Protests: Who Are the 99% and What Do They Want?, THE 
NEW YORKER (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/wall-street-protests-
who-are-the-99-and-what-do-they-want [https://perma.cc/6BYD-FLEC]; Ezra Klein, Who Are the 
99 percent?, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/ 
post/who-are-the-99-percent/2011/08/25/gIQAt87jKL_blog.html [https://perma.cc/77BW-ZASV]. 
Since that time, it has remained a part of common political parlance. See Brian Stelter, Camps Are 
Cleared, but ‘99 Percent’ Still Occupies the Lexicon, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2011), 
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This Article argues that the federal civil litigation system is its own 
one percent regime. Certain types of litigation—class action and 
multidistrict, for example—have become the poster children for the civil 
litigation system more generally, trotted out as examples of litigation run 
amok—damaging for business and by extension consumers, lucrative for 
nobody but the lawyers, and all too common. Indeed, these cases make 
headlines and sustain many large law firms,
5
 but they are not particularly 
common.
6
 When put in the context of state court litigation—indeed, the 
place where most civil litigation happens—and in the context of the 
remaining types of federal civil litigation, this elite and peculiar 
litigation is hardly dominant.
7
 
                                                     
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/us/we-are-the-99-percent-joins-the-cultural-and-political-
lexicon.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7HS2-TEN6] (“Most of the biggest Occupy Wall Street camps 
are gone. But their slogan still stands.”); Justin Wedes, Opinion, Occupy Wall Street, Two Years on: 
We’re Still the 99%, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2013, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2013/sep/17/occupy-wall-street-99-percent [https://perma.cc/3A8Y-TGAM]; WE 
ARE THE 99 PERCENT, wearethe99percent.tumblr.com [https://perma.cc/M6EJ-JEG7] (a website 
started at the beginning of the movement, which still continues posting stories from individuals who 
claim to be part of the ninety-nine percent). In addition, in this presidential election year, the one 
percent narrative resonates even louder, with economic populist messages undergirding the 
campaigns of both Bernie Sanders and—ironically—billionaire Donald Trump. See Drew DeSilver, 
The Many Ways to Measure Economic Inequality, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 22, 2015), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/22/the-many-ways-to-measure-economic-inequality 
[https://perma.cc/3YWM-NQSA]; Bernie Sanders on Economic Inequality, FEEL THE BERN, 
http://feelthebern.org/bernie-sanders-on-economic-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/9U4T-MKCL] 
(“Ninety-nine percent of all new income generated today goes to the top 1 percent. The top one-
tenth of 1 percent owns as much as wealth [sic] as the bottom 90 percent”) (quoting Bernie 
Sanders); Michael Lind, Donald Trump, The Perfect Populist, POLITICO (Mar. 9, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-the-perfect-populist-213697 
[https://perma.cc/WRB7-G7KL] (discussing how Donald Trump has cultivated a populist message 
that is stronger than many other centrist conservatives). 
5. See MITT REGAN, GEO. L. CTR. FOR THE STUD. OF THE LEGAL PROF., 2015 REPORT ON  
THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 10 (2015), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/ 
centers-institutes/legal-profession/upload/FINAL-Report-1-7-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/937R-JDGU] 
(“[L]itigation (including patent litigation) accounts for about 36 percent of overall billable hours—
35 percent for Am[erican] Law 100 firms and 37 percent for each of Am[erican] Law Second 100 
and midsized firms.”); John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service 
Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 3001 (2014); Associated Press, 
Settlements Reached in 2010 Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/05/21/business/energy-environment/settlements-reached-in-2010-gulf-oil-spill.html [https:// 
perma.cc/WRC4-EXSR]; Bill Vlasic, GM Will Face Further Discovery in Broader Class-Action 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/business/gm-will-face-
further-discovery-in-broader-class-action-case.html [https://perma.cc/5WCN-QC8M]. 
6. See infra Part II. 
7. See infra Part II. As will be discussed, many states adopt a version of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and federal procedure doctrines into their own state civil procedure practices. As a 
result, the federal civil litigation system has an impact much broader than just the federal courts.  
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Nonetheless, practitioners involved in these cases at the highest level 
wield a great deal of influence. Understanding why requires an 
appreciation of who these practitioners are: elite judges, lawyers, and 
parties. While not a literal one percent, the federal civil litigation system 
has much in common with the political rhetoric of the one percent 
because it is guided and controlled by such a small minority. In fact, the 
same judges, lawyers, and parties that participate in this high stakes, 
complex litigation are regularly relied upon for their expertise as to how 
litigation can best function.
8
 The result is one percent procedure—a 
system where the metaphorical ninety-nine percent of relatively small 
cases that are the bread and butter of federal and state dockets are 
governed by a set of rules made by and for the elite. 
For example, a group of fifteen individuals is largely responsible for 
drafting and amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through the 
Rules Enabling Act process.
9
 Scholars have determined that certain 
types of individuals are repeatedly appointed to the federal civil 
rulemaking bodies.
10
 Practitioners and academics dominated the early 
membership of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but starting in 1971, membership shifted so that judges 
became majority members of the committee, with practitioners coming 
in second, and academics coming in a distant third.
11
 During that same 
period, the practitioner members appointed shifted from multi-practice, 
albeit plaintiff-friendly, lawyers to attorneys that represented either 
corporate defendants or classes of plaintiffs.
12
 Moreover, since 1971, a 
conservative Chief Justice has made all of the committee 
appointments.
13
 And the appointments skew in a conservative direction: 
the data show that judges appointed by Republican presidents serve on 
the committee at a much higher rate than the number of Republican-
appointed judges on the bench more generally.
14
 
Similarly, the Supreme Court Bar consists of individuals who share 
like experiences and backgrounds. A recent Reuters series, The Echo 
                                                     
8. See infra Part II. 
9. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court 
Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1565 (2015). 
10. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 9, at 1565–71 (2015). 
11. Id. at 1567–68. 
12. Id. at 1569–71. 
13. Id. at 1572. 
14. Id. at 1573. As will be discussed in Part III, Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang have argued 
that this shift in committee composition has resulted in a shift toward pro-defendant proposals, at 
least with respect to private enforcement cases. Id. at 1578–79. 
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Chamber, found that from 2004 to 2012, an elite “66 of the 17,000 
lawyers who petitioned the Supreme Court” were able to get their 
clients’ cases heard at about six times a higher rate than other private 
attorneys.
15
 These particular attorneys accounted for less than 1% of the 
lawyers who filed petitions before the Supreme Court, but were involved 
in 43% of the cases that the Court decided.
16
 The study also determined 
that this elite group of lawyers benefited corporate parties, with fifty-one 
of the sixty-six working for “law firms that primarily represented 
corporate interests.”17 The Court has consequently heard more civil 
procedure cases in which businesses have an interest and has tended to 
decide those cases in their favor.
18
 As this Article will demonstrate, 
multidistrict litigation and class action practice reflect similar patterns of 
homogeneity. 
Thus, the Article argues that the entire civil litigation system is 
captured by lawyers, judges, and parties that, while participating in the 
rarest litigation, inevitably bend the rules of the civil litigation system 
toward their best interests. This is a problem for two reasons. First, 
social science teaches that such a homogeneous group of individuals is 
predisposed to act in a biased fashion.
19
 Second, political science 
demonstrates that optimal results are generally not obtained when 
doctrine and rules are constructed by a system that functions on the basis 
of diffuse costs and concentrated benefits.
20
 
The negative effects of one percent procedure on average litigants are 
apparent. For example, consider recent discovery amendments requiring 
proportionality—the idea that discovery be proportional to the needs of 
the case—in the definition of the scope of discovery.21 These 
amendments were passed over vehement dissent from the plaintiffs’ bar. 
                                                     
15. Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts & John Shiffman, The Echo Chamber: At America’s Court of 
Last Resort, a Handful of Lawyers Now Dominates the Docket, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/#article-1-the-elites 
[https://perma.cc/GLE4-UT77].  
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 
313, 314, 328, 332 (2012) (finding that the Court, in its first six terms under Justice Roberts, “heard 
and decided more than twenty cases in core civil procedure areas” and determining that like the 
Rehnquist Court, the “Roberts Court has shown similar hostility to litigation as a means of 
vindicating legal rights, the apparent difference being that this Court’s hostility manifests itself in 
general procedural doctrine”). 
19. See infra Part II. 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra notes 219–227 and accompanying text. 
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The problem of disproportionately high discovery costs is most acute in 
high-stakes litigation.
22
 Yet, the rule change affects all cases—a 
disconnect acknowledged by the Civil Rules Committee itself.
23
 
Thousands of comments challenged the wisdom of moving the 
proportionality analysis into the definition of discoverable information in 
Rule 26(b)(1), including comments from lawyers who litigate smaller 
cases.
24
 In its zeal to do something about high discovery costs in 
complex cases, the Rules Committee made it substantially more difficult 
for individual claimants in employment discrimination, consumer 
protection, and similar cases to get the discovery they would need to 
carry their burdens of proof.
25
 
Similarly, the Court has interpreted the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in ways that may benefit a small segment of the population 
and its litigation while affecting other parties quite differently. The 
Court’s interpretation of Rule 8 under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly26 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
27
 is an example. In these cases, the Court 
interpreted Rule 8 to require that a plausible claim be pleaded. The 
Court’s interpretation, by all accounts, was motivated by a sense that 
discovery costs were too high to allow frivolous claims to survive.
28
 Yet, 
the Court did not appear to consider how other kinds of litigation—
litigation that did not involve high-stakes discovery costs—would be 
affected by this change. According to recent studies, individuals with 
civil rights and employment discrimination cases—cases that do not 
generally have high discovery costs—have been most negatively 
affected.
29
 
                                                     
22. See infra Part II.A.1. 
23. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, CIVIL RULES COMMITTEE AGENDA REPORT 79–83 (2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/ Civil/CV2014-04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U6FG-537L].  
24. See CTR. FOR CONST. LITIG., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGES 
TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (2014), http://www.cclfirm.com/files/Report 
_050914.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6FG-537L] (noting that more than 2,300 comments were received 
in response to the Civil Rules Committee’s proposed amendments); Email from Valerie M. 
Nannery, Senior Litig. Couns., Ctr. for Const. Litig., to Hon. David G. Campbell, Chairman, Civ. 
Rules Advisory Comm. (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.cclfirm.com/files/040914_Comments.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V6EP-EZS6] (noting that most of the comments received were related to the 
discovery amendments). 
25. See infra Part I.C. 
26. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
27. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
28. See infra Part I.C. 
29. See id. 
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In addition, the structure of aggregate litigation also benefits the elite. 
The repeat-player phenomenon in aggregate litigation means that the 
most successful plaintiff and defense attorneys control this practice.
30
 In 
multidistrict litigation, for example, a handful of firms dominate plaintiff 
representation, and the same is true on the defense side.
31
 The Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) is similarly exclusive, as the 
judges on the panel are hand-picked by the Chief Justice and serve for 
seven-year terms.
32
 Moreover, the judges who ultimately handle class 
action and multidistrict litigation cases gain notoriety and become 
“expert[s]” in that kind of litigation.33 In other words, aggregate 
litigation is a highly specialized practice that tends to benefit and be 
designed for the one percent. Yet, when these same judges move to the 
rest of their docket, it is hard to imagine that the tricks of the trade they 
use in aggregate litigation—limiting discovery and encouraging 
settlement, for example—do not “trickle down” into how they handle the 
rest of their caseload.
34
 Relatedly, within these aggregate litigation 
practices, an additional hierarchy develops where the most exclusive 
attorneys control how the litigation functions, sometimes to the 
detriment of other lawyers and the parties.
35
 Recent criticism of some 
high-profile multidistrict litigation cases like the General Motors ignition 
litigation and the British Petroleum oil spill bear this out.
36
 In sum, these 
examples demonstrate how procedure appears to be developing in 
response to, and for the benefit of, a small segment of the civil litigation 
system without an awareness of, or perhaps concern about, how these 
changes will affect the rest. 
Finally, and perhaps most galling, while the wealthiest litigants have 
the greatest influence on how the civil litigation system works, they also 
                                                     
30. See infra Part I.B.1. 
31. See infra Part I.B.1. 
32. See infra Part I.B.1. 
33. See infra Part I.B.1. 
34. See infra Part I.B.1. 
35. See infra Part I.B.1. 
36. See John S. Baker, Jr., The BP Gulf Oil Spill Class Settlement: Redistributive “Justice?”, 19 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 287, 299–305 (2015) (questioning the BP settlement and whether the perverse 
incentives for lawyers during settlement proceedings actually achieve the best result for their 
clients); Erik Larson & Margaret Cronin Fisk, How GM Ignition-Switch Plaintiffs’ Lawyer Botched 
His Big Case, AUTO. NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.autonews.com/article/20160128/ 
OEM11/160129852/how-gm-ignition-switch-plaintiffs-lawyer-botched-his-big-case [https://perma. 
cc/AY37-XXYJ] (discussing how the lead lawyer arguably chose the wrong bellwether case for the 
GM litigation); Catherine M. Sharkey, The BP Oil Spill Settlements, Classwide Punitive Damages, 
and Societal Deterrence, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 681, 692–709 (2015) (discussing the criticisms and 
potential lessons of the BP litigation and settlement).  
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have the ability to opt out of the system—and force their opponents out 
too, if necessary—by seeking private solutions such as arbitration.37 In 
other words, the elite litigation player has the ability to dictate the rules 
of the game but also has the ability to refuse to play that game at all, 
instead substituting a different one. 
To be sure, in an attempt to equalize the system, there are special 
rules for pro se litigants and even some concrete help in the form of legal 
aid representation and sample civil litigation forms.
38
 But, like much of 
the public assistance we see in the socioeconomic context, these salves 
are rather hollow substitutes for robust and meaningful access to the 
civil litigation system.
39
 A real solution should level the playing field 
among all litigants—large or small—to ensure that the merits, not the 
rules, are what decide cases in our civil litigation system. 
Part I of the Article explains one percent litigation and how 
procedures by and for the one percent—in federal civil rulemaking, 
through the influence of the Supreme Court Bar, and in aggregate 
litigation—dominate that picture. This Part also examines the actors in 
each of these litigation categories, discusses how they are responsible for 
how procedure develops, and examines the perils inherent in a one 
percent procedure regime. Part II offers a critique of one percent 
procedure using both social science and political science as tools. This 
                                                     
37. See generally Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015) (examining arbitration and 
the challenges in providing a fair procedure for all parties); Judith Resnik, The Privatization of 
Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1793 (2014) (focusing on how arbitration has lessened the role of federal courts in 
adjudication and how it has affected fairness). 
38. See DONNA STIENSTRA, JARED BATAILLON, AND JASON A. CANTONE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 1–17, 28–35 (2011) (finding that a 
majority of district courts (84.4%) provide procedural assistance through the clerk’s office; that 
most district courts (95.5%) have permanent pro se law clerks; and that most district court judges 
use “broad standards” in construing pleadings and requiring compliance with deadlines); Margaret 
Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro 
Bono Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 
1891–1912 (1999) (finding that all of the courts sampled provided some sample forms accompanied 
with either written instructions or in-person filing assistance).  
39. See Denise S. Owens, The Reality of Pro Se Representation, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 147, 147–
59 (2013) (discussing the challenges facing pro so litigants and the general lack of affordable access 
to legal representation); Erik Eckholm & Ian Lovett, A Push for Legal Aid in Civil Cases Finds its 
Advocates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/us/a-push-for-legal-
aid-in-civil-cases-finds-its-advocates.html?_r=3 [https://perma.cc/J7LB-LZDJ] (examining the lack 
of legal help for low-income people); Press Release, Legal Servs. Corp., House Spending Bill Cuts 
LSC Budget by 20% (June 3, 2015), http://www.lsc.gov/media-center/press-releases/2015/house-
spending-bill-cuts-lsc-budget-20 [https://perma.cc/5TXB-ZKHJ] (announcing House of 
Representative’s 20% reduction of the Legal Services Corporation budget). 
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part will expand on why the elite corner of the civil litigation system is 
responsible for so much procedural development and why that result is 
problematic. Finally, this Part provides some suggested reforms that are 
tailored to maintain the expert benefits of a one percent procedure 
regime, but critically, intended to distribute more value to the vast 
ninety-nine percent. 
I. CIVIL LITIGATION’S ONE PERCENT PROCEDURE 
The rules governing federal civil litigation emerge from a variety of 
sources. Federal civil rulemaking committees draft and amend the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
40
 Federal courts implement and 
interpret the rules; under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, the rules are 
to be “construed, administered, and employed by the court” in order to 
“secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.”41 Finally, Congress can directly legislate procedural 
rules that apply in federal court—the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act and the Class Action Fairness Act are just a couple of 
examples.
42
 In other words, a handful of institutions and their 
institutional actors produce the rules that direct how federal civil 
litigation works.
43
 
Yet, a careful look at these sources of federal civil procedure raises its 
own set of valid questions. Who are the individuals within these 
institutions? Some are well known—members of Congress and Supreme 
Court Justices, for example. But, there are many others who directly and 
indirectly influence how procedural rules and doctrines develop. For 
example, who are the individuals who argue before the Supreme Court 
of the United States? Who are the judges that sit on the JPML? Who are 
the lawyers that litigate the bulk of aggregate litigation cases? Or, who 
sits on the committees that draft the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and who most successfully influences those committees? The answers to 
                                                     
40. See infra Part I.B.1. 
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
42. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104–67, 109. Stat. 737 (prescribing 
various discovery limitations in securities cases); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d) (2012) (allowing for removal of state-filed class actions to federal court provided certain 
requirements were met).  
43. See Peter Dubrowski, Preface, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 643 (2013) (noting about 
half of the states in the United States have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at the state 
level). It is worth noting that many states follow the federal rules by adopting similar rules within 
their state-court systems. To the extent federal civil procedure serves as a bellwether to state courts, 
the impact of federal procedure is even greater, as most civil litigation occurs in state court. 
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these questions reveal that there is a distinctive pattern in the “who.” 
These individuals are as exclusive as the litigation in which they engage. 
Visibly, they are overwhelmingly elite, white, and male. Experientially, 
they have cut their teeth on a certain type of litigation—litigation that 
involves highly resourced parties disputing complex issues. 
The sheer homogeneity of these individuals is interesting in and of 
itself. Beyond that aesthetic observation, however, this group’s 
composition is important because these players are responsible for both 
demanding and constructing much of the policy that governs all of 
federal civil litigation. In other words, this influential group largely 
dictates the rules by which litigation resolves, and looking at its 
composition helps to clarify how the entire federal civil litigation 
functions. 
Indeed, the result is a system of civil procedure that is of the one 
percent, by the one percent, and for the one percent.
44
 In this part, the 
Article will discuss the two strands of one percent procedure that 
emerge—the procedure that is by the one percent and the procedure that 
is for the one percent. The former—procedure by the one percent—
examines how institutions like the federal civil rulemaking bodies and 
the Supreme Court Bar produce and influence rules that benefit the most 
elite type of litigation, leaving other litigation largely out of the 
equation. The latter—procedure for the one percent—are the litigation 
systems that are set up in large part for the benefit of the most exclusive 
of litigation players. Aggregation procedures—multidistrict litigation 
and class action—tend to dominate this category. In addition to 
discussing these categories, the Article will also consider the 
characteristics of the individuals who are the most influential within 
each group and how those individuals impact the way procedure 
develops. Finally, this Part will examine why one percent procedure is 
problematic by providing examples of its impact on other kinds of 
litigation. 
Before laying out this elite litigation and the players that give rise to 
one percent procedure, however, there is one important caveat. The 
Article will not discuss at great length the ideological movements behind 
one percent procedure. Many of the one percent players are motivated by 
business or ideological interests, and this Article does not dispute that is 
                                                     
44. This passage is a modification of President Abraham Lincoln’s famous line from the 
Gettysburg Address: “and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not 
perish from the earth.” See Abraham Lincoln, President, United States of America, The Gettysburg 
Address (Nov. 19, 1863), http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm 
[https://perma.cc/MJ8R-RF4X]. 
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the case. However, the Article’s focus is to demonstrate the existence of 
one percent procedure, consider whether it is problematic, and offer 
potential reforms, not to engage in a political debate. It is also worth 
noting that one percent procedure, unlike much of the rhetoric around 
one percent versus the ninety-nine politically, is not as clearly a liberal 
versus conservative dichotomy. As will be discussed, many of the one 
percent actors in the multidistrict litigation and class action context 
might be categorized as politically liberal; they are plaintiffs’ lawyers 
after all. Yet, these same lawyers contribute significantly to the 
development of one percent procedure. 
A. Procedure by the One Percent 
In this Part, the Article examines how civil procedure is constructed 
by the one percent. More specifically, it looks at how a committee 
system comprised of one-percent players drafts and amends the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. It also analyzes how the Supreme Court’s 
agenda is influenced by one percenters. 
1. Federal Civil Rulemaking 
The federal civil rulemaking process, which is chiefly carried out by 
the Civil Rules Committee, has evolved over time. Specifically, the 
committee’s composition and its members’ roles in the rulemaking 
process have changed. The first committee, appointed by the Court in 
1934, consisted of only practitioners and academics.
45
 The Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934 had just been passed, and the only process in place 
was the one that the members of the newly-formed committee 
envisioned for themselves. Thus, once appointed, the committee set to 
drafting the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
46
 It circulated its 
drafts to members of the Bar, but there was nothing official about its 
process—it was mostly ad hoc.47 
The process has since changed. Currently, because of various 
modifications to both the Rules Enabling Act and the related processes 
that guide the committee’s work, there is a standard committee structure 
and practice.
48
 The Standing Committee on the Federal Rules of Practice 
                                                     
45. See Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil 
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 274 (2009). 
46. Id. at 275. They modeled their process off of the American Law Institute’s approach to 
considering proposals.  
47. Id.  
48. Id. at 277. 
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and Procedure sits above five advisory committees, one of which is the 
Civil Rules Committee.
49
 That committee consists of fifteen members, 
all appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for terms of up 
to six years.
50
 In addition, the rulemaking process itself now has multiple 
steps, including review by the Standing Committee, the Judicial 
Conference of the Courts, and the Supreme Court.
51
 Moreover, the Civil 
Rules Committee publishes its proposals for public comment, a process 
that involves written comments and, when appropriate, oral testimony.
52
 
The process, however multi-layered it may be, still relies greatly on the 
members of the committee itself. After all, these are the individuals who 
decide which rules will be pushed forward—these are the individuals 
who set the agenda for how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will 
develop. 
a. Committee Composition 
In the early years, the Civil Rules Committee was made up of lawyers 
and academics, but that composition has gone through two shifts—one 
of slight change from the late 1950s to the early 1970s and one of major 
change from the early 1970s to present day.
53
 The committee was 
discharged in 1956, but was reconstituted in accordance with new 
legislation in 1958, adding Judicial Conference oversight and giving rise 
to the current committee structure.
54
 When the new committee started its 
work in the late 1950s, it still consisted of mostly practicing lawyers and 
academics, but it added three judges.
55
 Starting in the late 1960s, the 
                                                     
49. Id.  
50. Id.; see also Committee Membership Selection, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection [https://perma.cc/82PY-
MF47].  
51. Coleman, supra note 45, at 277–78. 
52. Id. at 278–79. 
53. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 9, at 1563–69.   
54. See Order Discharging the Advisory Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956), Pub. L. No. 85-313, 72 
Stat. 356 (1958); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE REGULAR ANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 6–7 (Sept. 17–19, 1958).  
55. See Albert B. Maris, Federal Procedural Rule-Making: The Program of the Judicial 
Conference, 47 A.B.A. J. 772, 774 (1961). In 1961, the Committee consisted of eight attorneys, four 
professors, and three judges. Id. Maris noted that the members of the Committees “constitute[d] a 
nationally known group of experienced judges, lawyers and law teachers” who “were carefully 
selected by the Chief Justice so as to be widely representative of the Bench, the Bar and the law 
teachers.” Id. He wrote that the group included “representative lawyers engaged in the various types 
of practice, in the legal specialties, and those active in the bar associations.” Id. They were “widely 
distributed geographically” and appointed to overlapping four-year appointments, renewable only 
once “thus assuring the infusion of new blood and new ideas into the program as the years pass.” Id. 
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Chief Justice began appointing an even greater number of judges to the 
committee, a trend that has continued to this day.
56
 Professors Stephen 
Burbank and Sean Farhang have closely studied the committee’s 
composition and determined that during the period from 1958 to 1971—
before the second shift in composition began—”there were never less 
than seven . . . practitioners,” “never more than three . . . judges,” and 
“never less than three academics” on the committee.57 
The committee has profoundly changed between 1971 and the present 
day, with judges taking up more seats than practitioners and academics 
combined.
58
 Today, the committee is made up of nine judges—seven 
federal district court judges, one federal appellate court judge, and one 
state judge—four practitioners, one representative from the Department 
of Justice, and one academic.
59
 Two professors serve as reporters to the 
committee, but they do not exercise any voting power.
60
 
Thus, more judges, fewer academics, and a somewhat static number 
of practitioners now serve on the committee. This shift in composition, 
on its own, is worth investigating. But, there is an additional shift in 
composition: who the practitioners on the committee represent in their 
professional practice and who—a Democrat or Republican president—
appointed the judge members of the committee to their Article III 
judgeships. 
The practitioners on the committee are now disproportionately 
corporate defense lawyers, and the handful of plaintiffs’ lawyers tend to 
specialize in complex litigation. For example, from 1960 to 1971, a total 
of twelve practitioners served on the committee at one time or another.
61
 
Of those, eight practiced law in firms that represented both plaintiffs and 
defendants, three were in firms that primarily represented plaintiffs, and 
one was in a firm that primarily represented defendants.
62
 The 
                                                     
56. Coleman, supra note 45, at 290.  
57. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 9, at 1566; see also Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-
Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant 
Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1144–52 (2015) 
(reviewing the current membership of the Civil Rules Committee). For an article discussing the 
connections between large law firms and the Committee, see generally Mark W. Bennett, Essay: 
The Grand Poobah and Gorillas in Our Midst: Enhancing Civil Justice in the Federal Courts—
Swapping Discovery Procedures in the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and Other 
Reforms Like Trial by Agreement, 15 NEV. L. J. 1293 (2015). 
58. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 9, at 1568.  
59. Committee Membership Selection, supra note 50 
60. Id.  
61. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 9, at 1566–67.  
62. Id. As the authors note, the classification system employed—categorizing a lawyer as 
“defendant” or “plaintiff” or “individual” or “business” only if he represented more than 75% of 
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practitioner committee members of today bear little resemblance to this 
picture. The defense bar is much more dominant in its committee 
membership: according to Burbank and Farhang’s study, there has been 
“a substantial shift [away from plaintiff and] toward defense 
practitioners” on the committee.63 In addition, the practitioner profile has 
shifted from lawyers with a mix of clients to lawyers that specialize in 
representing businesses or individuals, but rarely both.
64
 Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers on the early committee represented both individual and business 
interests, but the plaintiffs’ lawyers on the modern committee represent 
individuals or classes almost exclusively.
65
 On the other side, the 
defense lawyers on the committee represent solely business interests.
66
 
The changes in judicial composition are also pronounced. During the 
1960s, four judges served on the committee.
67
 Two were appointed by a 
Democratic president and two were appointed by a Republican 
president.
68
 According to Burbank and Farhang’s study, this parity no 
longer exists. Comparing the overall number of Democratic and 
Republican appointed judges to the number of such judges sitting on the 
committees from 1970 to 2013, the authors found that, adjusting for the 
population of judges overall, Republican appointees served on the Civil 
Rules Committee at a 161% greater rate than Democratic appointees.
69
 
In other words, “[b]eing appointed by a Democratic president is 
significantly associated with a lower probability of serving on the 
Committee.”70 Judges who were appointed by a Republican president 
have a 2.3 times greater chance of being appointed to the committee than 
their Democratic-appointee counterparts.
71
 
                                                     
that type of client—meant that most of the practitioners on the early committees could not be 
categorized. Id. at 1569–70. Instead, many were categorized as “both.” This is in stark contrast to 
modern practitioners who are one category or the other. Id.   
63. Id. at 1569. 
64. Id. at 1570. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. As Burbank and Farhang note, this trend may be due to changes in the broader legal 
market, rather than the Chief Justice’s preferences. Id. Nonetheless, the information is significant 
and worth noting because—no matter why the change has happened—it will have an impact on how 
the committee functions.  
67. Id. at 1566.  
68. Id.  
69. Id. at 1573.  
70. Id. at 1574.  
71. Id. The data on judicial appointments is not limited to party affiliation, however. Burbank and 
Farhang’s study also found a predisposition for the appointment of white men. Id. A white federal 
judge had a 5.1 times greater chance of being appointed to a committee than a non-white judge. Id. 
These statistics, like the party affiliation stats, are adjusted for overall population. In other words, 
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In sum, the committee membership is a fairly homogeneous group—a 
group that arguably has a conservative ideological bent and which also 
has a practice experience that is grounded in defending corporations.
72
 
However, even arguably non-conservative practitioner members of the 
committee share homogeneity with the rest of the committee members. 
Though they represent plaintiffs, as one commentator has put it, they 
“operate in the rarified world of complex litigation.”73 As will be 
discussed later in this Article, the composition of the committee appears 
to deeply influence how the committee functions and what kinds of 
changes it makes. 
                                                     
the authors found that non-white judges accounted for 11% of the “judge years” that they looked at, 
but only accounted for 2% of the committee service years that they observed. Id. This is in contrast 
to gender as an indicator, which seems to be insignificant to probability of committee service in this 
case. Id. at 1575. 
72. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-
archives-rules-committees/meeting-minutes [https://perma.cc/NF6A-UKL5] (providing links to 
meeting minutes for the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules and Practice and Procedure. The 
author reviewed the minutes to identify the names of committee members and the durations of their 
terms.). A final “type” of member is the academic appointment to the committee. While the number 
of academic appointments is down to only one, the composition of that sole member is of interest. 
Since 1985, there have been seven voting academic members of the committee: Professor Maurice 
Rosenberg (Columbia Law School, 1985–87); Professor Mark Nordenberg (University of 
Pittsburgh, 1988–93); Professor Thomas Rowe (Duke Law School, 1994–99); Professor John 
Jeffries (University of Virginia, 1999–2005); Professor Myles Lynk (Arizona State University, 
1998–2004); Professor Stephen Gensler (University of Oklahoma, 2005–11); and Professor Robert 
Klonoff (Lewis & Clark, 2011–present). All seven are men and six out of the seven are white. The 
most recent appointment, Bob Klonoff, appears to have the most litigation experience, having 
served as the Assistant to the Solicitor General during the Reagan Administration and as a law 
partner at Jones Day. See Law Faculty: Robert Klonoff, LEWIS & CLARK L. SCHOOL, 
https://law.lclark.edu/live/profiles/310-robert-klonoff [https://perma.cc/HM5J-3BLG]. Others have 
substantial practice experience as well. Professor Myles Lynk, who worked as an associate at 
various law firms, became a partner at Dewey Ballantine and also served as Special Assistant to the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. See Myles V. Lynk Curriculum Vitae, ARIZ. ST. UNIV., 
https://apps.law.asu.edu/files/faculty/cvs/lynkmyles.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C9N-3JSM]. Professor 
Maurice Rosenberg practiced law at Cravath, Swain and Moore and also served as the Assistant 
Attorney General during the Carter Administration. See Legal Scholar Rosenberg is Dead at 75, 21 
COLUM. UNIV. REC. (Sept. 8, 1995), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/record/archives/vol21/vol21 
_iss1/record2101.34.html [https://perma.cc/4B3Y-4AJU]. 
73. See also Elizabeth Thornburg, Cognitive Bias, the “Band of Experts,” and the Anti-Litigation 
Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 762 (2016) (stating that Duke Law School’s Judicial Center 
Advisory Council “held an invitation-only conference in November 2014 (under Chatham House 
rules), whose ultimate goal is to develop a ‘best practices document, which will provide 
authoritative guidance on implementing the proportionality standard.’”) (citing Implementing 
Discovery Proportionality Standard Conference (Invitation Only), DUKE L., 
https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/november2014 [https://perma.cc/PN7C-KCJW]).  
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b. Committee Member Roles and Unofficial Involvement 
The composition of the official committee is not the only aspect of 
civil rulemaking that is worth interrogating. Other aspects include the 
lack of turnover on the committee’s composition and the fluidity 
between official and unofficial committee activities. Committee 
members often serve for periods beyond their official six-year terms, 
either because of changes in their roles, which lead to longer official 
service, or because they participate in unofficial rulemaking activities 
that keep them deeply engaged in the rulemaking process.
74
 
One example is quite illuminating: scholars have scrutinized the close 
connection between the Duke University School of Law and the federal 
civil rulemaking process, which has effectively blurred the line between 
formal and informal rulemaking processes. In 2010, the law school 
hosted what came to be known as the 2010 Duke Civil Litigation 
Conference.
75
 Academics, judges, and practitioners attended the 
conference to discuss the state of federal civil litigation.
76
 In particular, 
the conference focused on why civil litigation is so expensive and how 
that problem could be fixed.
77
 To that end, groups like the American 
College of Trial Lawyers, the Institute for the Advancement of the 
American Legal System, and the Federal Judicial Center reported on 
studies they had conducted.
78
 These studies—and the conference as a 
whole—laid the foundation for the Civil Rules Committee’s adoption of 
the most recent collection of discovery amendments, including the 
controversial proportionality rules. 
Following this conference, the Duke Center for Judicial Studies was 
founded. Its stated focus was “on two core areas of programming: 
scholarly study of the judiciary and educational programs for judges.”79 
As to the former, in its original announcement, the Center hoped to “host 
academic conferences” and to “fund graduate fellows and visiting 
scholars” in their judicial research.80 As to the latter, the Center planned 
to offer a master’s degree in judicial studies, a program meant to “help 
                                                     
74. See supra notes 87–97 and accompanying text.   
75. Duke Law Hosts Conference on Litigation in Federal Courts, May 10–11, DUKE L. NEWS 
(May 5, 2010), https://law.duke.edu/news/4933/ [https://perma.cc/659X-PKLE]. 
76. John G. Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE L.J. 537, 539 (2010).  
77. Id. at 538.  
78. Id. at 538–39.  
79. Duke Law Announces New Center for Judicial Studies, DUKE L. NEWS (June 6, 2011), 
https://law.duke.edu/news/6524/ [https://perma.cc/GGR8-ETM9]. 
80. Id. 
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judges better understand the institution of the judiciary, judicial systems 
around the world, and current research on judicial decision-making.”81 
This master’s program was to be offered over two summers in four to six 
week intensive sessions.
82
 The original announcement also stated that 
“shorter, more targeted continuing education programs also will be 
offered, including seminars on topics of rapid legal change or areas that 
require a high degree of specialized knowledge such as international 
law, human rights law, global financial markets and regulation, and 
international arbitration.”83 
Since the founding of the Center, it has hosted thirteen conferences.
84
 
The subjects covered by these programs range from a discussion of 
presidential and judicial oversight of administrative agencies to 
multidistrict litigation to patent law.
85
 All of these programs include an 
array of distinguished speakers, including faculty and members of the 
judiciary.
86
 The conferences are invitation-only and are limited to 
“prominent judges, lawyers, and academics” who are expected to 
“discuss important issues fully and frankly in a collaborative 
environment.”87 An individual interested in attending a conference can 
contact the Center, and if she meets the Center’s standards, she will be 
invited, can pay the fee, and attend.
88
 
The Center has an advisory council that is made up of distinguished 
lawyers. This advisory council includes current Civil Rules Committee 
members like Elizabeth Cabraser and former members such as Sheila 
Birnbaum, Daniel Girard, and Chilton Varner.
89
 Finally, the Center’s 
Board consists of four judges, one of whom is former member and chair 
                                                     
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. The Duke Conferences, DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., https://law.duke.edu/ 
judicialstudies/conferences/ [https://perma.cc/2NB9-E2S3]. As of August 2016, the Center hosted 
thirteen conferences, but had three additional conferences planned.   
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Advisory Council for the Duke Conferences, DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., 
https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/advisorycouncil/ [https://perma.cc/P6FK-AB56]. 
Members also include general counsels of major U.S. companies such as David Howard from 
Microsoft, Robert Hunter from Altec, Inc., JoAnn Lee from ExxonMobil, and Anthony Walsh from 
GE’s Power & Water. Id.; see also Thornburg, supra note 73, at 7; Committees on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure Chairs and Reporters, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/file/committee-rules-
practice-and-procedure-chairs-and-reporters [https://perma.cc/MP8G-U6FQ]. 
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of the Civil and Standing Committees, Judge Lee Rosenthal.
90
 
Additional judges with current ties to the rulemaking committees 
previously served on this council, but they have since removed 
themselves from council service. 
Thus, the connections between the Duke Center for Judicial Studies 
and the federal rulemaking process are strong. This has led to some 
criticism of the Center’s activities and how those activities may be 
viewed as an extension of the civil rulemaking process. At the heart of 
the controversy is a set of “guidelines” facilitated and developed by the 
Center.
91
 These guidelines were drafted and adopted months before the 
new discovery rules went into effect on December 1, 2015, and are 
meant to provide judges with guidance as they implement the new 
discovery rules. Scholars have criticized the drafting of the guidelines, in 
part, because they appear to be part of the official civil rulemaking 
process.
92
 Garnering further criticism is the Center’s ongoing program, 
“Hello ‘Proportionality,’ Goodbye ‘Reasonably Calculated’: 
Reinventing Case Management and Discovery Under the 2015 Civil 
Rule Amendments.”93 That program, led by former members of the 
rulemaking committees, has travelled to ten courthouses throughout the 
country to provide “training” on the recently-adopted discovery 
amendments.
94
 Again, some commentators have questioned the use of 
privately generated guidelines in training sessions that have the 
appearance of an official rulemaking activity.
95
 
                                                     
90. Center Board, DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/ 
board/ [https://perma.cc/K5MH-HS38]; ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, supra note 23. 
91. Guidelines and Practice for Implementing the 2015 Discovery Amendments to Achieve 
Proportionality, DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD. (July 20, 2016) (annotated version), 
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/civil_rules_project_draft-
july_16_formatted.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB79-3UJ6].   
92. See Thornburg, supra note 73, at 7; Patricia W. Moore, Law Professor Challenges the 
Seeming Federal Endorsement of Duke Nonbinding “Guidelines” on Proportionality Amendments, 
CIV. PROCEDURE & FED. CTS. BLOG (Nov. 17, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
civpro/2015/11/law-professor-challenges-the-seeming-federal-endorsement-of-duke-nonbinding-
guidelines-on-proportion.html [https://perma.cc/V78L-R2WH]; Suja Thomas, Via Duke, Companies 
are Shaping Discovery, LAW360 (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.law.illinois.edu/news/article/3175 
[https://perma.cc/9E3S-NB9F].  
93. Hello ‘Proportionality,’ Goodbye ‘Reasonably Calculated’: Reinventing Case Management 
and Discovery Under the 2015 Civil Rule Amendments, DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD. (May 9, 
2016), https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/proportionality/ [https://perma.cc/FM8R-
JRD3].  
94. Id. Judge Lee Rosenthal, a former chair of both the Civil and Standing Committees, and 
Professor Steven Gensler, a former Civil Rules Committee member, are listed as the leaders of these 
discussions. Id.  
95. See Thomas, supra note 92.  
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Whether that criticism is reality or perception, what leads to further 
concern about the Center is that many of its strongest financial sponsors 
are large corporations such as Merck & Co., Pfizer Inc., and Bayer 
Corp.
96
 Law firms also sponsor the Center—and those firms represent 
both plaintiffs and defendants—but even then, the plaintiffs’ firms, 
much like the lawyers who serve on the Civil Rules Committee, 
primarily represent classes of plaintiffs in large complex cases.
97
 These 
connections have also led to renewed questions about the 2010 Duke 
Civil Litigation Conference and its part in the most recent discovery rule 
amendments.
98
 For example, it is accepted that the conference gave rise 
to the discovery amendments, including the controversial proportionality 
rules; yet, as at least one commentator has noted, there was no consensus 
or demand for changes to proportionality at the conference.
99
 
The ties between large corporate interests and the rulemaking process 
appear to exist at both an official and unofficial level. As already 
discussed, large corporations and law firms that engage in one percent 
litigation already have heightened access to the official rulemaking 
process. Similar access to these unofficial processes raises concerns over 
how the lines between what is official and unofficial have indeed started 
to blur. Moreover, committee members—past and present—tend to serve 
in multiple roles that are also sometimes connected to official and 
unofficial rulemaking activities.
100
 Overall, the rulemaking process, 
while it has always been elite, is now elite in a way that skews in the 
direction of serving the interests of high stakes, complex litigation. As 
will be discussed later in Part II, there is good reason to be concerned 
about this homogeneity. 
                                                     
96. Duke Conference Sponsors, DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., https://law.duke.edu/ 
judicialstudies/sponsors/ [https://perma.cc/H6G8-PPFH]. 
97. Id. For example, the two major plaintiffs’ firms are Girard Gibbs LLP and Lieff Cabraser 
Heimann & Bernstein LLP. 
98. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 57, at 1088–89. 
99. Id. at 1091 (“Notably, the report specifically stated that the definition of the scope of 
discovery did not need to be changed.”). 
100. For example, the most recent Chair of the Civil Rules Committee, Judge Campbell, 
continues to serve on the Civil Rules Committee in an unofficial capacity by leading a 
subcommittee study into court pilot programs. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, COMMITTEE 
AGENDA REPORT 509 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-
books/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-november-2015 [https://perma.cc/CG43-JC4P]; 
Standing Committee Meeting Minutes, January 1, 2016, at 12–13, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-
policies/archives/meeting-minutes/committee-rules-practice-and-procedure-january-2016 
[https://perma.cc/ZR3X-TB2B]. He is doing this work on behalf of the committee even though his 
term with the committee has ended. 
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2. Supreme Court Bar 
The Supreme Court generally chooses which cases it will hear, and 
with this discretion comes a great deal of power. The Court determines 
whether it or not it will decide an issue and, in that way, it heavily 
dictates how the law develops and in which directions it will move.
101
 
Thus, the cases that are presented to the Court for a certiorari decision 
are worth examining. As critical as the substantive make-up of the 
thousands of cases that request certiorari is who is behind those cases.
102
 
Indeed, the lawyers who bring these cases are an increasingly important 
part of how Supreme Court law develops. 
Richard Lazarus argued in 2008 that the previous two decades had 
seen the re-emergence of an elite Supreme Court Bar, a select group of 
advocates who had and continue to have a profound impact on which 
cases the Court hears, and to some degree, the way the Court decides 
those cases.
103
 The statistics appear to support his thesis. While the 
Office of the Solicitor General always had good success before the Court 
and gave former members of its office a stellar reputation upon their 
departure, the privatization of that expertise did not take hold until the 
mid-1980s.
104
 At that time, large law firms like Sidley Austin and Mayer 
Brown & Platt hired former Solicitors General as partners in their firms 
to start a Supreme Court practice focused on representing well-resourced 
private clients.
105
 Once those firms were successful, other firms joined in 
the trend, with some firms even spinning off standalone Supreme Court 
practice-based firms.
106
 Finally, leading law schools like Harvard and 
Stanford founded Supreme Court clinics that married private 
                                                     
101. Adam Feldman & Alexander Kappner, Finding Certainty in Cert: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Factors Involved in Supreme Court Certiorari Decisions from 2001–2015, VILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 4), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715631 
[https://perma.cc/Z5AW-TLT2]) (“By choosing to hear certain cases with specific facts, the Court 
decides which issues it will tackle and which to avoid. In doing so the Court must decide between 
issues that are more or less controversial and more or less salient to the general public.”).  
102. Id. at 4–5. In the 2013 Supreme Court term, 7,326 writs of certiorari were filed, with the 
Court granting review of approximately 1% of those cases. Id. at 2. 
103. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming 
the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008). The first notable “Supreme Court 
Bar” occurred during the early nineteenth century when infamous lawyers like Francis Scott Key, 
Daniel Webster, and William Pinkey argued hundreds of cases. Id. at 1489–90. 
104. Id. at 1492–97. 
105. Id. at 1498.  
106. Id. at 1499–1501.  
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practitioners, clinical faculty, and students in order to take on high-
profile pro bono cases.
107
 
According to Lazarus, the emergence and success of this specialized 
bar is due to two factors. First, a movement by corporations to obtain 
favorable results in the Court.
108
 Second, Rehnquist’s contraction of the 
Court’s docket, which meant that experts would have a better chance of 
vying for those cherished spots.
109
 Whatever the reasons may be, the 
elite Supreme Court Bar is here; moreover, it is obtaining phenomenal 
results for its clients. For example, in the 2006 October Term, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce won thirteen out of its fifteen cases, its “highest 
winning percentage [to date] in its [then] 30-year history.”110 
The Supreme Court game is an especially complicated one. The first 
measure of success is whether clients can get their case reviewed by the 
Supreme Court in the first place. The law firms that represent clients like 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce are successful, across the board, with 
the leading private firms obtaining grant rates of anywhere from 1% to 
25%, depending on the particular year.
111
 For example, in the 2007 
October Term, members of the elite Supreme Court Bar filed thirty-five 
of the sixty-five cases where the Court granted certiorari.
112
 They appear 
to have some influence on what cases the Supreme Court will take. 
The second measure of success is whether the attorney wins the case, 
which is heavily influenced by the briefing and the argument. The 
briefing is handled by the firms that obtained certiorari in the first place 
and so there again, the elite Supreme Court Bar is well in place. But, 
when it comes to the oral argument, it is not just firms that are dominant, 
it is particular individuals. In the 2007 October Term, 24% of the total 
oral arguments were done by individuals who had more than one oral 
argument during that term, and 28% of the oral arguments were done by 
someone who had argued ten or more times before the Court in the 
aggregate.
113
 
Other studies have confirmed that the elite Supreme Court Bar exists. 
As noted earlier, a recent Reuters series, The Echo Chamber, found that 
from 2004 to 2012, an elite “sixty-six of the 17,000 lawyers who 
petitioned the Supreme Court” were able to get their clients’ cases heard 
                                                     
107. Id. at 1502.  
108. Id. at 1503. 
109. Id. at 1503–04. 
110. Id. at 1490–91. 
111. Id. at 1515–16. 
112. Id. at 1517.  
113. Id. at 1520.  
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at about six times a higher rate than other private attorneys.
114
 These 
particular attorneys accounted for less than 1% of the lawyers who filed 
petitions before the Supreme Court, but were involved in 43% of the 
cases that the Court decided.
115
 In another study looking at non-solicitor 
general attorneys, the cert grant rates for the top ten attorneys ranged 
from 18% to 28%.
116
 This same study also looked at what happened to 
certiorari requests when many of these same attorneys were arguing 
against cert.
117
 Here again, the statistics show that members of the 
Supreme Court Bar are most successful; their denial rates ranged from a 
low of 62.5% to a high of 94.7%.
118
 By all accounts, the members of this 
elite group seem to have the ear of the Supreme Court. 
The next question is: who are these individuals? The Reuters study 
determined that they mostly work for corporate parties, with fifty-one of 
the sixty-six working for “law firms that primarily represented corporate 
interests.”119 More than half of them clerked for the Supreme Court.120 
They are no doubt well-educated, pedigreed, and experienced, but this 
translates into quite a homogeneous group. Moreover, they come from a 
standard group of law firms. One study found that from 2009 to 2012, a 
collection of just a dozen firms, including Sidley Austin and Jones Day, 
were the most prominent players in the certiorari stage of Supreme Court 
practice, with lawyers from those firms successfully garnering a cert 
grant 18% of the time as opposed to the average of 5%.
121
 
Finally, the question is whether this group is actually winning cases 
for its clients. There too, the studies say yes. For example, between 2003 
and 2006, the Court heard eleven antitrust cases.
122
 (This is in contrast to 
                                                     
114. Biskupic, Roberts, & Shiffman, supra note 15. 
115. Id. 
116. Feldman & Kappner, supra note 101, at 27. The top ten attorneys were Christopher Landau, 
Carter Phillips, Charles A. Rothfeld, Thomas C. Goldstein, Eric Schnapper, David C. Frederick, 
Theodore B. Olson, Paul D. Clement, Andrew Pincus, Seth P. Waxman, and Jeffrey Fisher. Id.  
117. Id. at 29–30.  
118. Id. at 30–31. Christopher Landau’s cert denial rate was 94.7% in the eighteen cases where he 
was listed as a responding attorney.  
119. Biskupic, Roberts, and Shiffman, supra note 15 (the study also found that of the sixty-six 
lawyers, “[sixty-three] are white,” and “only eight are women”).  
120. Id.  
121. Id. A larger group of thirty-one firms was able to achieve a 44% success rate in grants of 
certiorari. Id. Feldman and Kappner’s study similarly found that the law firms housing members of 
the Supreme Court Bar had greater success at the cert stage. Feldman & Kappner, supra note 101, at 
37. Between 2012 and 2015, Goldstein & Russell had a success rate of 30%, Latham & Watkins 
28.3%, and Stanford Law School’s Supreme Court Litigation Clinic 25%. Id. 
122. Lazarus, supra note 103, at 1532.  
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the two antitrust cases it heard between 1992 and 2002.)
123
 In all eleven 
of the cases, the petitioners seeking certiorari were defendants, and in 
ten out of the eleven, counsel was a member of the elite Supreme Court 
Bar (the eleventh was the Solicitor General). In all ten of those cases, the 
petitioner won.
124
 As one scholar noted, “[t]he private Supreme Court 
Bar has . . . influenced the thinking of the Court, persuaded them that 
certain areas of the law require their attention, and then, on that basis, 
secured grants of certiorari.”125 Antitrust is just one area where there has 
been a rise in Supreme Court attention. Another area is tort liability and 
limits on punitive damages.
126
 
However, the influence of the elite Supreme Court Bar is not limited 
to the business community. The elite Supreme Court Bar tends to work 
for businesses, representing them 77% of the time.
127
 But, members of 
this group also represent individuals the remaining 23% of the time.
128
 
Even when representing individuals, the impact of this group of lawyers 
is profound. The Court accepted 30% of the individual petitions filed by 
members of the elite Supreme Court Bar compared to only 1% of 
petitions filed by other lawyers.
129
 
Yet, even though the practice areas vary, the bulk of the cases in 
which the elite Supreme Court Bar is involved are those that are of great 
interest to the business community.
130
 And, by all accounts, the business 
community is winning. Aside from the actual win rates, the Court’s 
willingness to take a look at such issues is a substantial advantage for the 
parties championing these causes. That is because, historically, the grant 
of certiorari is a sign. The Court does not always reverse in the case 
before it, but in most years, the Court’s reversal rate runs about 65%.131 
In other words, gaining a grant of certiorari really is a win for clients 
because their chances of succeeding are quite high. Beyond that, 
however, the win rates for the clients of the elite Supreme Court Bar 
have increased.
132
 For instance, the Court reversed in favor of the 
petitioner-defendant in all ten of the antitrust cases discussed earlier, 
                                                     
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 1532. 
126. Id. at 1534. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id.  
130. Id. at 1532.  
131. Id. at 1540.  
132. Id. at 1539–49. 
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notably even overruling its own precedent in order to do so.
133
 
According to another study, the Roberts Court, during its first nine years, 
ruled for business parties 60% of the time, in contrast to the Rehnquist 
Court’s final nine years, which only ruled in favor of business parties 
48% of the time.
134
 
In sum, the specialized Supreme Court Bar appears to be a 
phenomenon that is here to stay. And, much like the individuals who 
dominate the rulemaking committees, members of this elite group share 
many of the same characteristics. There are, of course, determinative 
factors other than the name of lawyer filling the petition for certiorari—
whether the party is a repeat player, the salience of the issue on appeal, 
the court from which the decision is being appealed, and the political 
timing of the case.
135
 Moreover, there is an argument that the success of 
the elite Supreme Court Bar is due to selection bias—the idea that these 
specialists choose the cases that are most likely to win.
136
 However, at 
least one current study has found that “litigants, in the aggregate, have 
considerably higher odds of success when they have Supreme Court 
specialists as their counsel . . . [a] difference [that] cannot simply be 
ascribed to selection bias.”137 Even if there is selection bias or other 
factors affecting these studies, it appears the identity of the lawyer 
bringing and arguing the case has some degree of impact on what the 
Court looks at and what it decides. That these individuals then share 
similar backgrounds and experiences is worthy of consideration when 
determining how one percent procedure develops. 
B. Procedure for the One Percent 
In contrast to procedures that are made by the one percent, this 
section will discuss litigation procedures that have become litigation 
tools for the one percent. While they are available transsubstantively, 
                                                     
133. See id. at 1548; see, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
(1911); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 880 (2007) (overruling 
Court precedent regarding per se rules in vertical agreements). 
134. Biskupic, Roberts, & Shiffman, supra note 15. 
135. Feldman & Kappner, supra note 101, at 18, 20.   
136. Selection bias “is defined as a process through which study subjects are selected in a way 
that can misleadingly increase or decrease the magnitude of an association.” Bruce R. Parker, 
Understanding Epidemiology and Its Use in Drug and Medical Device Litigation, 65 DEF. COUNS. 
J. 35, 42 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).  
137. Jeffrey L. Fisher, A Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar, 65 STAN. L. REV. 137, 145 
(2013). Fisher explains, “[e]ven holding all else constant, specialists’ clients prevail at significantly 
higher rates than nonspecialists’ clients. Presumably, this comparative advantage is even stronger at 
the certiorari stage, where expertise comes more directly into play.”  
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these procedures have developed in such a way that they tend to work in 
favor of, and be tailored to, the demands of the one percent litigation 
players. This Article will examine examples in the context of aggregate 
litigation—class action, multidistrict litigation, and the settlement 
mechanisms for mass litigation. 
This section will also analyze how these procedures create further 
hierarchies within the one percent. For example, multidistrict litigation is 
a procedure that often works in favor of the one percent, but even within 
multidistrict litigation, there is a pecking order. In economics, the top 
0.01% consists of roughly 14,000 families who hold 5% of the United 
States income.
138
 Multidistrict litigation similarly benefits the most elite 
of the elite—certain lawyers who are repeat players in this kind of 
litigation have far more power than their outsider elite brethren. 
Aggregate litigation is a large umbrella under which many 
overlapping civil litigation mechanisms can be covered. For ease of 
discussion, the Article separately discusses multidistrict litigation, class 
action, and settlement. Yet, there is much fluidity among these three 
categories. For example, in the recent litigation over the “Deepwater 
Horizon” oil spill, the case was consolidated into a multidistrict 
litigation action before Judge Carl Barbier, where pieces of it were 
certified for class settlement and handled by a claims administrator.
139
 
No doubt that the categories that will be discussed necessarily cross over 
one another and involve many of the same individuals. Yet, for ease of 
discussion, this section will treat the categories separately and will 
attempt to avoid any unnecessary redundancy while doing so. 
1.  Multidistrict Litigation 
Multidistrict litigation (MDL) was created in 1968 by statute.
140
 It 
allows for the consolidation of a set of cases to one judge for resolution 
of various pretrial matters.
141
 The consolidation is ordered by a so-called 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) when and if that panel 
determines that the civil actions at issue “involv[e] one or more common 
questions of fact” and that transfer of the “proceedings will be for the 
                                                     
138. Ford Fessenden & Alan McLean, Where the 1 Percent Fit in the Hierarchy of Income, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/30/nyregion/where-the-one- 
percent-fit-in-the-hierarchy-of-income.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4RSK-872B]. 
139. See DEEPWATER HORIZON CLAIMS CENTER, http://www.deepwaterhorizoneconomic 
settlement.com/ [https://perma.cc/5U25-872P].  
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 29 (1991).  
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).  
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convenience of the parties and witnesses and will promote the just and 
efficient conduct of such actions.”142 The basic premise of the statute is 
that the panel can review a group of related cases and consolidate them 
in order to streamline the resolution of related pretrial matters. Congress 
intended for each of the cases to be returned to their original places of 
filing once that review is done. The reality is quite different, however, 
with about 97% of MDL cases ending in the transferee district court in 
settlement or dismissal.
143
 
The multidistrict litigation statute was inspired by litigation involving 
private antitrust actions against electrical equipment manufacturers.
144
 
These cases arose following the successful litigation of antitrust claims 
by the United States government against those same manufacturers.
145
 
After that litigation, more than 1800 separate damage actions were filed 
in more than 30 federal district courts.
146
 Because there was no power to 
consolidate all of these cases before one district judge, the Judicial 
Conference created a subcommittee to assist the various federal judges 
in coordinating, to the degree they could, resolution of much of the 
overlapping pretrial matters.
147
 Once that subcommittee had done its 
work, the Judicial Conference set its sights on creating a statute that 
would allow for the kind of consolidation that could have resolved the 
electrical manufacturer cases more easily.
148
 
Thus, multidistrict litigation was born. The JPML is made up of seven 
circuit and district court judges.
149
 These judges are appointed by the 
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
150
 The JPML can seek 
to consolidate cases on its own or it can consolidate cases (or not) on the 
basis of a motion made by one of the parties to the potentially 
consolidated action.
151
 If the JPML declines to consolidate the cases, the 
cases remain where they are and nothing else happens.
152
 However, if 
                                                     
142. Id. 
143. Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due 
Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U.L. REV. 109, 128 (2015). 
144. Resnik, supra note 140, at 31. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2012). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. § 1407(c)(i), (ii). 
152. Resnik, supra note 140, at 34. There is no appeal of a decision to decline consolidation, but 
if the JPML grants consolidation, an appeal can be taken only by an “extraordinary writ.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407(e) (2012). 
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the JPML decides to consolidate the cases, the panel must then also 
decide on a judge, known as a “transferee judge,” to handle all of the 
pretrial matters in the case.
153
 As will be discussed further, this 
transferee judges wields a great deal of power. While the statute 
envisioned that cases would return to their original places of filing 
following resolution of pretrial matters, the reality is that only 3% of 
cases return.
154
 Many of these cases settle, and that settlement is heavily 
impacted by the transferee judges and the decisions they make. 
In the beginning, multidistrict litigation was not used as often as one 
might think. The class action rule, Rule 23, had been adopted only two 
years earlier, and it appeared to be the mechanism of choice for those 
pursuing aggregate claims. But, as certification of class action cases has 
grown more difficult,
155
 multidistrict litigation has increased in use and 
in prominence. For example, major cases such as the Vioxx litigation, 
the British Petroleum oil spill, and Toyota’s defective acceleration cases 
have been handled using multidistrict litigation.
156
 The increase in MDL 
cases has been criticized, with some scholars arguing that “MDL 
involves something of a cross between the Wild West, twentieth-century 
political smoke-filled rooms, and the Godfather movies.”157 Due in part 
to its newfound prominence and in part to the unique set of 
circumstances under which MDL functions, the players in multidistrict 
litigation are worth scrutinizing. 
The individuals involved in multidistrict litigation fall into three 
general categories. First, the JPML, the body that decides whether and 
how cases and consolidated. Second, the transferee judge, the judge that 
dictates how the case proceeds pretrial and exercises an enormous 
amount of power over which attorneys take the lead and how the case 
might or might not settle. Finally, the lawyers who end up leading the 
                                                     
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i), (ii). 
154. See Redish & Karaba supra note 143. 
155. See Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 781–84 (2012) (summarizing developments 
that are making it harder to certify class actions); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731 (2013) (“The class action device, once considered a ‘revolutionary’ 
vehicle for achieving mass justice, has fallen into disfavor.”) (citation omitted). 
156. Alex Berenson, Merck Is Said to Agree to Pay $4.85 Billion for Vioxx Claims, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 2007, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/09/business/09merck.html?_r=0 (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2016); John Schwartz, Accord Reached Settling Lawsuit over BP Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
3, 2012, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/us/accord-reached-settling-lawsuit-over-bp-oil-
spill.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2016); Bill Vlasic, Toyota Agrees to Deal in Suit over Speedups, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2012, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/business/toyota-settles-lawsuit-
over-accelerator-recalls-impact.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
157. Redish & Karaba, supra note 143, at 111. 
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case and on the so-called steering committees, who also exercise a great 
deal of power over how the case transpires and is resolved. 
The first category, the JPML, is made up of district and circuit court 
judges who serve on the panel for a seven-year term.
158
 Thus, the panel 
is a moving target, but a fairly stable one. As currently constituted, the 
JPML’s current chairwoman is the Hon. Sarah V. Vance (E.D. La). The 
remaining panel members include Hon. Marjorie O. Rendell (3d. Cir.), 
Hon. Charles R. Breyer (N.D. Ca.), Hon. Lewis A. Kaplan (S.D.N.Y), 
Hon. Ellen Segal Huvelle (D. D.C.), Hon. R. David Proctor (N.D. Ala.), 
and Hon. Catherine D. Perry (E.D. Mo.).
159
 This particular panel 
includes three women, a first for a JPML.
160
 Six of the seven members 
are judges who were appointed by President Clinton, with the seventh 
having been appointed by President George W. Bush.
161
 As for practice 
experience, six of the seven judges come from private practice, with 
many of the judges practicing in complex litigation. The seventh 
member, Judge Breyer, has a background more strongly focused in 
public and government lawyering. 
One major criticism of the panel—as well as one of its tributes—is 
that the panel is too quick to transfer cases. Historically, the transfer 
rates have been quite high, ranging from a low of 47% in 1981 to a high 
of 86% in 2006.
162
 The panel sees all kinds of cases ranging from mass 
torts to securities cases.
163
 Most of the judges appointed to the JPML by 
the Chief Justice are district court judges who have already been on the 
bench for about eight years at the time of appointment.
164
 This is 
                                                     
158. This seven-year term was set by custom by Chief Justice Rehnquist and has been continued 
by Chief Justice Roberts. John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 2225, 2227 (2008) (“Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist imposed some regularity and 
predictability on the appointment process by establishing staggered seven-year terms for each 
member.”). 
159. Panel Judges, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/ 
content/panel-judges [https://perma.cc/TTT9-B6Y5].   
160. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Where Are All the Women in the Courtroom?, TRIAL, Mar. 2014, at 29 
(2014).  
161. See Panel Judges, supra note 159.  The Panel appointees are about evenly divided between 
judges appointed by Democrats and Republicans. Tracey George & Margaret S. Williams, The 
Judges of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 11 (Vand. U. L. School, L. and Econ. 
Working Paper No. 13-25, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2308906 
[https://perma.cc/N3HT-34WQ]. This is in contrast to Judicial Conference Committee 
appointments, which include the Civil Rules Committee. Id. Those committees have been about 
40% Democrat-appointed and 60% Republican-appointed. Id. 
162. See Heyburn, supra note 158, at 2229.  
163. Id. at 2229–30.  
164. George & Williams, supra note 161, at 8. 
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probably because such judges are likely to have had more experience 
with complex litigation.
165
 How the panel members’ backgrounds inform 
their decision making has yet to be studied, but it does not seem beyond 
reasonable belief to assume that their complex litigation experience 
plays a part in whether they decide to consolidate a case or not.
166
 
Yet, whether the case will be consolidated is not the JPML’s greatest 
power. Instead, its greatest power is its decision as to which judge the 
entire collection of cases will be sent. This decision is entirely within the 
discretion of the JPML, and as the former chair of the JPML Judge 
Heyburn stated, “[t]his is often the most difficult decision the Panel 
faces.”167 The JPML’s choice is largely unguided, but it can consider 
variant factors: the parties’ preferences; the location of the discovery or 
critical witnesses; whether previous proceedings have already occurred 
in a location; whether there is a judge who is already presiding over a 
subset of cases; or whether there is a judge who, while not currently in 
charge of any of the cases, has pertinent experience that will allow her to 
better address the case.
168
 According to Judge Heyburn, though, the 
“ideal transferee judge is one with some existing knowledge of one of 
the cases to be centralized and who may already have some experience 
with complex cases.”169 
At least one study found that the JPML is “more likely to assign cases 
to a district court where a current panelist sits and that is supported by at 
least one defendant and to a district judge who currently serves on the 
Panel.”170 In fact, current JPML members are more than “three times as 
likely to take an MDL assignment.”171 It appears that the JPML 
considers complex litigation experience, leadership roles, and familiarity 
                                                     
165. Id. 
166. The Federal Judicial Center study by George and Williams examined the “attributes and 
social background, judicial experience, and appointing President and Chief Justice for the forty-six 
MDL panel judges who have served from the Panel’s creation in 1968 through the end of 2012.” Id. 
at 3. It did not, however, attempt to link those attributes to any distinct decision making pattern.  
167. Heyburn, supra note 158, at 2239.  
168. Id. at 2239–40. There are additional factors the JPML considers. See DAVID F. HERR, 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL (2015); Daniel A. Richards, An Analysis of the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation’s Selection of Transferee District and Judge, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 311, 
321–22 (2009) (chronicling sixteen factors considered by the JPML).  
169. Heyburn, supra note 158, at 2240.  
170. Margaret S. Williams & Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The 
Decision to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 424, 
424 (2013).  
171. Id. at 456. 
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when assigning these cases to judges.
172
 The result is a fairly familiar 
cast of characters who serve as transferee judges such as Judge 
Weinstein and the asbestos cases, Judge Pointer and the breast implant 
litigation, Judge Fallon and the Vioxx litigation, Judge Hellerstein and 
the 9/11 litigation, and more recently, Judge Barbier and the British 
Petroleum oil spill litigation.
173
 These judges are, no doubt, well-
respected and in many cases, well known. Yet, as Judge Heyburn 
acknowledges, the group of judges that the JPML might consider for the 
transferee position is often limited to judges that have a pedigree in 
complex litigation.
174
 Moreover, the transferee judges must consent to 
taking on the case, meaning that these cases are run by a group of judges 
who, to a certain degree, have sought out the MDL experience.
175
 
Once a transferee judge is selected, the power then shifts to her. A 
major area over which the transferee judge has an incredible amount of 
power is her ability to decide who will represent this vast array of 
plaintiffs that are now before her.
176
 This ability, more than any other 
power, is what scholars have most scrutinized.
177
 As a result of 
consolidation, average plaintiffs effectively no longer have a direct say 
                                                     
172. Id.; see also Richards, supra note 168, at 321–22 (discussing an array of factors cited for 
transferee judge selection in JPML transfer orders).  
173. Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 
1989 (1999) (discussing how Judge Sam Pointer, handling the consolidated federal Multidistrict 
Litigation (MDL) in the breast implant cases, appointed a “National Science Panel” to assist the 
court in examining the scientific issues); Edward F. Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and 
Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict Litigation Judges, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 237, 239 (2011) 
(discussing how the Panel chose New Orleans judge, Judge Carl J. Barbier, as transferee judge 
presiding over the BP oil spill litigation); Alison Frankel, Vioxx Judge Steps in to Split $350 Ml 
Plaintiffs Lawyer Pie, REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2011/08/11/vioxx-judge-steps-in-to-split-350-ml-plaintiffs-lawyer-pie/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7QE7-XADA]; Michele Galen, The Man Who’s Cutting Through the Asbestos Mess, BLOOMBERG 
BUS. (Jan. 27, 1991), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1991-01-27/the-man-whos-cutting-
through-the-asbestos-mess [https://perma.cc/X8TB-AU25] (discussing Weinstein’s role in the 
Manville and Eagle-Picher asbestos cases as exemplifying his aim of crafting an efficient and fair 
way of handling mass torts cases); Mireya Navarro, Empathetic Judge in 9/11 Suits Seen by Some as 
Interfering, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/nyregion/03judge. 
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3EAV-FQBZ].  
174. Heyburn, supra note 158, at 2240. 
175. Id. at 2242–44. See also Williams & George, supra note 170, at 440 (“The appointment [as a 
transferee judge] is seen as recognition of a judge’s skill and acumen and a sign of his or her 
status.”). 
176. Redish & Karaba, supra note 143, at 122 (“Rather than deal directly with scores of 
attorneys, transferee courts appoint a limited number of lawyers to serve on “steering committees” 
to manage the litigation.”). 
177. See generally Redish & Karaba, supra note 143; Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105 (2010); 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2015). 
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in how the litigation will move forward because their counsel is no 
longer individually representing them in the case.
178
 As in the class 
action context, the premier academic concern is that by aggregating the 
litigation, the benefit might be a more efficient resolution, but the cost 
will be the individual plaintiff’s due process right to be adequately 
represented.
179
 
A secondary and related concern is focused on how counsel is 
selected, why that selection might be unfair to the other attorneys, and 
why that selection is not optimal for the bulk of the plaintiffs being 
represented. The charge is that the repeat-player attorneys have an 
advantage in the MDL context because they either know the limited 
number of transferee judges, their experience means that they can be 
trusted to do a thorough job, or there is some combination of the two. As 
scholars have criticized, the “MDL judge’s selection of lead counsel is 
not subject to effective appellate review, even though the choice may 
turn out to be outcome-determinative in many ways.”180 Further, 
“[r]epeat MDL plaintiffs’ counsel can work behind closed doors to lobby 
for specific attorneys to be named to the steering 
committee . . . mak[ing] it extremely difficult for a newcomer attorney to 
receive enough support to be selected for a leadership role.”181 Again, 
accusations of “smoke-filled rooms” and an artificially limited number 
of plaintiffs’ attorneys abound. 
Recent scholarship by Elizabeth Chamblee Burch has shed some 
much-needed light on this very issue: what is the composition of the 
lawyers who are appointed to leadership positions in MDL cases? 
                                                     
178. Redish & Karaba, supra note 143, at 117–18 (“But once her case is transferred to an MDL, 
the district judge decides who will really represent her interests in the MDL. Suddenly, all of the 
decisions the claimant made about exercising her rights through litigation—which lawyer to hire, 
when and where to file a lawsuit, and against whom—have been replaced by decisions made by 
federal judges and court-sanctioned attorneys.”). 
179. See, e.g., id.; Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute 
Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 539 (2013) (“Nonetheless, the harnessing of the settlement 
class device to MDL jurisdiction resonates in back-room deal making, blanketed with an aura of 
judicial legitimacy and largely liberated from the due process concerns and protections associated 
with the class action itself.”). But see Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative 
Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 
627 (2011) (“This Article argues that the way to solve the puzzle is to reconceive the process-based 
day-in-court right. Doing so reveals that there are cases in which no one has a day-in-court right and 
cases where parties have only a limited right. Thus, the mismatch between justification and doctrine 
is reconciled by altering both justification and doctrine: a better understanding of the day-in-court 
right implies a broader role for nonparty preclusion. It also shows that there is more similarity 
between class actions and other large-scale case aggregations than is commonly supposed.”). 
180. Redish & Karaba, supra note 143, at 142.  
181. Id. 
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Burch’s work demonstrates that many scholars’ suspicions were indeed 
accurate.
182
 In Burch’s study, she collected data from seventy-two 
product liability and sales-practices multidistrict litigation cases that 
were pending as of May 14, 2013.
183
 What she found was that so-called 
repeat-players were regularly appointed to leadership positions in the 
litigation. For example, while only 31% of the individual attorneys 
involved in the multidistrict litigation were elevated to leadership 
positions, almost 64% of the individuals holding those positions were 
repeat players.
184
 Indeed, 30% of those leadership roles were occupied 
by a select fifty attorneys who were lucky enough to be named lead 
attorneys in five or more multidistrict cases.
185
 Burch found a similar 
pattern with respect to law firms. In her study, only roughly 41% of law 
firms were repeat players in the cases; yet, lawyers from those firms held 
almost 80% of all of the leadership positions.
186
 She found that 16% of 
the law firms involved held just over a majority of the leadership 
positions in the cases.
187
 
In other words, the attorneys who end up controlling the plaintiffs’ 
side of multidistrict litigation comprise a very select group of individuals 
from an equally select group of law firms. This leaves many of the 
original individual plaintiff’s counsel quite disgruntled by what they see 
as a system that is rigged to benefit those who sit in these elite circles.
188
 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, many scholars have worried that the 
composition of the leadership positions, as well as the lack of structured 
review of their decision making, may not lead to optimal results for all 
plaintiffs.
189
 
                                                     
182. See Burch, supra note 177.  
183. Id. at 95.  
184. Id. at 96.  
185. Id.  
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 96–97. 
188. See Hon. John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL 
Process, 38.3 LITIG. 26 (2012). Heyburn and McGovern cite a survey of roughly ninety MDL 
attorneys that found that “[a] substantial group of local plaintiffs’ counsel resent the panel’s role in 
facilitating national plaintiffs’ counsels’ ‘takeover’ of their cases. They criticize a repeat-player 
syndrome in the selection of plaintiffs’ MDL counsel.” Id. at 30. Judge Heyburn, former Chair of 
the JPML responded, “[w]e know that our orders can effectively disenfranchise some local 
plaintiffs’ counsel. In every case, we ask ourselves whether centralization sufficiently promotes 
justice and efficiency, so much so that we should inconvenience some for the benefit of the whole.” 
Id. 
189. Burch, supra note 177, at 119 (arguing that transferee judges should encourage dissent and 
modify their fee awards in order to incentivize plaintiffs’ lawyers to adequately represent all of the 
plaintiffs). 
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As will be discussed further in Part II, there are certainly reasons to be 
concerned about the composition of the lawyers leading multidistrict 
litigation cases. For the purpose of this section, however, the point is that 
from the top to the bottom, the multidistrict litigation system is 
comprised of an elite and narrow group of individuals. Starting with the 
JPML all the way down to the lead lawyers representing plaintiffs’ 
consolidated cases, the players are individuals who have similar pedigree 
and experience. 
2.  Class Action 
As noted earlier, there is considerable overlap between the 
practitioners in class action and those in multidistrict litigation because, 
in many modern cases, class action certification is sought in the context 
of an MDL. Thus, this section will only briefly focus on some of the 
traits of current class action practitioners, with the caveat that these same 
lawyers have to some degree already been discussed above as members 
of the elite MDL leadership. 
Today’s class action attorneys are largely more elite than they once 
were. Historically, the image of the class action attorney was that of a 
scrappy, somewhat greedy, solo practitioner who put it all on the line for 
his one big case.
190
 Or, it was the specter of a civil rights attorney 
seeking justice for those most marginalized. While some of those 
caricatures might still be true, the class action plaintiffs’ lawyer of today 
is more complicated. Today’s plaintiffs’ class action attorney most likely 
comes from a relatively large and well-resourced firm.
191
 For example in 
Legal 500’s 2015 ranking of the five top plaintiffs’ firms for labor and 
employment, three had more than 25 attorneys.
192
 For the same ranking 
for plaintiffs’ firms engaged in toxic tort litigation, all four of the top 
four firms had more than 25 attorneys.
193
 The class action bar cannot be 
painted with one broad brush, but suffice to say the prominent class 
action lawyer of today’s era has much more in common with his 
adversary’s counsel than in the past. They are elite, well resourced, and 
well organized. 
                                                     
190. Morris Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’ Class Action Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 757, 764–
66 (2012). 
191. Id. at 773. 
192. See Mass Tort and Class Action: Plaintiff Representation–Labor and Employment, THE 
LEGAL 500 UNITED STATES, http://www.legal500.com/c/united-states/litigation/mass-tort-and-class-
action-plaintiff-representation-labor-and-employment [https://perma.cc/G8J5-6YBN].  
193. See id. Weitz & Luxenberg PC was listed in the top five, but has since disbanded.  
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Indeed, one of the major criticisms of the current class action 
plaintiffs’ bar is that the mechanisms in which they now operate—
multidistrict litigation leading to court-approved or contractual 
settlement—have led them to identify more with their adversaries than 
with their clients. As Linda Mullenix has argued, “[a]gainst th[e] 
backdrop [of MDL], the interests of plaintiffs’ counsel and defense 
counsel converged. Both sought to exploit the favorable MDL 
environment to forge favorable deals, resolving massive liabilities.”194 
As critics have noted, the freedom from “the threat of irksome objectors 
seeking to derail accomplished arrangements,” as well as the freedom 
from the class action rule requirements, have made complex litigation 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ counsel look more and more alike.195 
3.  Settlement 
Settlement is a reality of civil litigation and one that is especially true 
in aggregate litigation. Settlement rates for civil litigation have been 
pegged at over 90% by some sources,
196
 and while the exact number is 
not necessarily known, the overwhelming sense of the bench, bar, and 
the academy is that settlement is common, and it is here to stay. In 
aggregate litigation, settlement is just as complex as the litigation that 
creates the need for it. Judges and litigants have responded by crafting 
different solutions to these challenges. 
Judge Weinstein, as one of the first judges to confront such 
complexity, utilized an innovation that has become standard fare for 
litigation of this type—the appointment of special masters. In the Agent 
Orange Litigation of the 1980s, Judge Weinstein appointed a young Ken 
Feinberg to oversee the settlement as a “special master.”197 That 
litigation was a federal class action brought against Agent Orange 
manufacturers by Vietnam veterans who had allegedly suffered from 
exposure to the gas.
198
 The settlement was lauded as a success, as it was 
                                                     
194. Mullenix, supra note 179, at 540. 
195. Id. 
196. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotions and Regulation of 
Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (“Oft-cited figures estimating settlement rates of 
between 85 and 95 percent are misleading; those figures represent all civil cases that do not go to 
trial.”). 
197. See Mike Sacks, Who You Gonna Call? Ken Feinberg: In His Latest Role, Mediator-in-the-
Spotlight Sets Sights on Troubled Pension Plans, NAT’L L. J. (Oct. 5, 2015). Special masters are 
private lawyers, former judges, or law professors that serve as adjuncts to the judge under FED. R. 
CIV. P. 53. 
198. Id.  
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the largest mass tort settlement at the time.
199
 Once that settlement was 
achieved, the use of special masters became much more common in 
complex cases.
200
 
Ken Feinberg is the king of special masters. Indeed, he is nothing 
short of a household name for those who follow litigation of this type. 
He has overseen the resolution of settled claims for myriad cases, 
including the General Motors’ faulty-ignition-switch settlement and the 
British Petroleum Gulf Coast Claims Facility.
201
 He has also been 
enlisted by the federal government to manage other funds and 
settlements, including the World Trade Center Victim Compensation 
Fund and the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014.
202
 
Feinberg is not alone, however. He is part of a larger trend of judges 
and government officials calling on outsiders to help formulate and 
implement resolution of complex claims. The group of individuals called 
upon to be special masters is decidedly and necessarily small. Feinberg 
does not do it all himself, but the other individuals who do look a lot like 
him. For example, Professor Francis McGovern served as a special 
master on the DDT toxic exposure litigation, the Dalkon-Shield 
controversy, and a dispute over fishing rights in the Great Lakes of 
Michigan.
203
 By definition, the special masters come from a small group 
of people who share similar backgrounds and pedigree—successful 
lawyers, professors, and former judges who all have a certain level of 
legal education and law practice in common. 
For example, in the current Volkswagen emissions scandal litigation, 
the JPML consolidated hundreds of class action suits and transferred the 
cases to the Northern District of California.
204
 The JPML assigned the 
case to Judge Charles Breyer, a current member of the JPML.
205
 While 
Judge Breyer was not sitting on the panel that made the assignment 
decision, he was still a part of the seven-member JPML.
206
 Since his 
                                                     
199. Id. 
200. Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping 
Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 397–98 (1986).  
201. Mullenix, supra note 179, at 515–16; see also Sacks, supra note 197. 
202. Id. 
203. Brazil, supra note 200, at 399–403, 410. 
204. Jessica Karmasek, MDL Established for Class Actions Filed Over Volkswagen Emissions 
Scandal, LEGALNEWSLINE (Dec. 9, 2015), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510652111-mdl-
established-for-class-actions-filed-over-volkswagen-emissions-scandal [https://perma.cc/3VRR-
49K8]. 
205. Id. 
206. United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation Transfer Order, In re: Volkswagen 
“Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation (Dec. 8, 2015), 
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appointment, Judge Breyer has announced his plans to appoint a special 
master to oversee the settlement negotiations: former FBI Director 
Robert Mueller.
207
 A number of contenders vied for the spot, including 
former judges like Judge Layn Phillips and Judge Edward Infante, and 
professional special masters like Ken Feinberg, but Breyer went in a 
different direction.
208
 Mueller is currently a partner at Wilmer Cutler 
Pickering Hale & Dorr. There, he focuses on crisis management and 
cybersecurity.
209
 Interestingly, Mueller’s firm represents Volkswagen’s 
auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers A.G., and has been retained by 
Volkswagen specifically for advice regarding the tax implications of the 
emissions controversy.
210
 Apparently Mueller has been “walled off” 
from this ongoing work within his own firm.
211
 Perhaps in response to 
any misgivings about the appointment and the connection to a firm that 
represents one of the parties, Breyer stated that “[t]here are few, if any, 
people with more integrity, good judgment, and relevant experience than 
Mr. Mueller.”212 Breyer’s impression may indeed be true. There is no 
doubt that there are benefits to expertise; yet a singular focus on 
expertise—excluding important factors like the value of diversity, the 
danger of unconscious bias, and the downside of a repeat-player 
phenomenon—has also led to a fairly small special master pool where 
there are many repeat players splashing around. 
The settlement that involves special masters is often one that is 
public, in the sense that the judge monitors and approves the settlement 
agreement. Recent trends in settlement have taken that process out of the 
public and have made settlement a matter of private contract. One 
version of this involves contractual aggregate non-class settlement. Here 
again, the cases are consolidated under the MDL statute, but once there, 
the parties enter into a private agreement without seeking class 
                                                     
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/MDL-2672-TO-2015-12-08.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/72BU-GWV2].   
207. Amanda Bronstad, Wilmer’s Robert Mueller Named VW Settlement Master, NAT’L L. J. 
(Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202746760712/Wilmers-Robert-Mueller-
Named-VW-Settlement-Master?slreturn=20160818160347 [https://perma.cc/G4HD-TCWA].  As of 
September 2016, some aspects of the litigation had been settled while others were ongoing.  See In 
re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” MDL, U.S. D. CT., N.D. CAL., http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/crb/ 
vwmdl [https://perma.cc/G5B8-JHSW].   
208. Bronstad, supra note 207.  
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
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certification or otherwise needing the approval of the court.
213
 Instead of 
waiting the months necessary to consolidate the cases, the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys involved meet with defense counsel to create a private 
settlement deal.
214
 This deal applies not to a class, because one has not 
even been certified, but instead applies to all individual claims.
215
 The 
settlement must still be presented to the MDL judge, but the judge will 
most often approve the deal. Because the parties reached it amicably, 
and the class action rules do not apply unless a class is certified within 
the MDL, there is no requirement to scrutinize the agreement.
216
 The 
structure of this kind of settlement means that the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
who wield the most power among their ranks and who have the most 
access to defense counsel are the ones most likely to strike these deals. 
As the discussion in the MDL section above makes clear, these attorneys 
are, in a word, elite. 
C. Perils of One Percent Procedure 
A procedural system created by and for the one percent is not 
problematic simply because it is a one percent product. It is problematic 
because it underestimates, and perhaps even undervalues, other types of 
litigation. In this Part, the Article will focus on the bottom line of one 
percent procedure by delineating some examples of how one percent 
procedure does not work for the ninety-nine. 
First, procedures designed by the one percent are concerning because 
they fail to account for how such procedures will affect different kinds 
of litigation. Examples of these procedures include the recent discovery 
amendments and the interpretation of Rule 8 pleading by the Court in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. These changes 
came from the federal civil rulemaking committee and the Supreme 
Court, respectively. They are examples of how procedures that emerge 
from a group of one percent players can be detrimental to other kinds of 
cases. 
Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to include certain “proportionality” 
factors in the definition of the scope of discovery.
217
 Most of those 
factors were previously located in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), which was a 
part of the rule that would be implicated when the producing party 
                                                     
213. Mullenix, supra note 179, at 541. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id.  
217. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
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requested relief from the burden of discovery.
218
 While the rulemakers 
repeatedly argued that moving the factors from Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to the 
definition of the scope of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1) was not a 
significant change, plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys vehemently 
disagreed on that point.
219
 
Many commentators agreed with plaintiffs’ lawyers’ aversion to this 
rule change. In cases where the discovery was already proportional, this 
rule change encourages parties to consider holding back discovery that 
they believe might not be proportional. 
220
 If the party does indeed hold 
back from either searching for or producing the requested information on 
the basis of proportionality, the opposing party has no choice but to 
bring a motion to compel.
221
 This will likely create additional motion 
practice and work for the courts, as well as delay.
222
 As one 
commentator explained, “[t]he effect of including proportionality into 
the initial scope of discovery will likely be to place the burden on the 
party moving to compel to show that its discovery request was 
proportional.”223 This means that run-of-the-mill cases might now have 
higher discovery costs and burdens associated with them—costs that 
they would not have had absent this rule change. In other words, 
“plaintiffs in certain typical cases—for example, employment 
discrimination cases—may be affected more than others.”224 As will be 
discussed in Part II, the stated motivation for this rule change was to 
decrease discovery costs; yet, the cases that rulemakers focused on were 
the cases with which they were most familiar—the one percent. While 
the actual effect of amended Rule 26(b)(1) remains to be seen, there is a 
                                                     
218. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, supra note 23, at 84. 
219. See CTR. FOR CONST. LITIG., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGES 
TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2–4 (2014) (noting that more than 2,300 comments were 
received in response to the Civil Rules Committee’s proposed amendments); Letter from Valerie M. 
Nannery, Senior Litig. Couns., Ctr. for Const. Litig., to Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Civ. Rules 
Advisory Comm. 2 (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.cclfirm.com/files/040914_Comments.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V6EP-EZS6] (noting that most of the comments received were related to the 
discovery amendments). 
220. See Suja A. Thomas & Dawson Price, How Atypical Cases Make Bad Rules: A Commentary 
on the Rulemaking Process, 15 NEV. L.J. 1141, 1156 (2015)  
221. Id. 
222. Id. (arguing that the changes to proportionality might encourage parties to under-produce 
and could result in more motion practice and delay in the courts).  
223. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 57, at 1116. 
224. Thomas & Price, supra note 220, at 1156. 
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good argument that it will have a negative impact on non-one-percent 
cases.
225
 
Another example of procedure by the one percent is the Court’s 
interpretation of Rule 8 pleading under Twombly and Iqbal. In those 
cases, the Court introduced the concept of plausibility pleading, the idea 
that courts must assess the plaintiff’s complaint for plausibility. 
Numerous commentators attacked these decisions for a variety of 
reasons, ranging from the departure from established “notice” pleading 
principles to the argument that the Court had circumnavigated the 
federal civil rulemaking process.
226
 Whatever the veracity of these 
criticisms, defendants have certainly taken advantage of the cases, as 
motion to dismiss filing and grant rates have increased since the 
decisions came down.
227
 
What is most troubling about this change, however, is that individual 
plaintiffs with particular kinds of claims are bearing the brunt of 
Twombly and Iqbal’s effect. For example, one study found that grant 
rates in motions to dismiss in civil rights cases increased by 19%.
228
 The 
same study found that individual parties fared far worse than 
organizational parties, with the dismissal rates for corporate claimants’ 
complaints increasing from 32% to 37% under Twombly and Iqbal, 
while individual claimants’ dismissal rates increased from 40% to 
58%.
229
 As that commentator explained, “although one might expect 
individuals to fare worse than organizations as a general matter in our 
legal system, the data also suggest that plausibility pleading has 
                                                     
225. See id. at 1142 (“[A]rguing that advisory committees should refrain from proposing and 
adopting rule amendments that are motivated by atypical cases.”).  
226. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of 
Transsubstantive Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1189, 1191–93 (2010) (discussing the effect of 
Twombly and Iqbal on notice pleading); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A 
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 18, 22 (2010) (“[P]lausibility 
pleading [has] undone the relative simplicity of the Rule 8 pleading regime and the limited function 
of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”). 
227. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 
2121 (2015) (“The data presented here strongly support the conclusion that dismissal rates have 
increased significantly post-Iqbal, and in addition suggest many other troubling consequences of the 
transition to the plausibility standard.”). See also JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR., MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES vii (2011); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do 
Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 601–02 (2010); Patricia Hatamyar 
Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 
603, 603–09 (2012). 
228. Reinert, supra note 227, at 2146. 
229. Id. at 2155.  
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increased the extent of the inequality.”230 This point is important because 
in both Twombly and Iqbal, the defendants were large organizations—a 
large telephone conglomerate and the United States government. As will 
be discussed in Part II, the concerns animating this kind of litigation—
that involving large entities and the potential for complex and costly 
discovery—reflect the experience of the decision makers. The effect, 
however, is felt by all kinds of litigants in the civil litigation system, 
even those with cases that are quite unlike the situations presented in 
Twombly and Iqbal.
231
 
Beyond the negative impact of one percent procedure that is created 
by the most elite, there is also a negative effect from procedures created 
for the one percent. For example, there is something of a “trickle-down” 
effect from this kind of litigation where the procedures that may work 
best in one context are not necessarily the best fit for other types of 
litigation.
232
 
As to this effect, there are a few examples. Judges who see aggregate 
litigation cases and rulemakers who mostly practice in complex cases 
tend to paint the entire system with a broad brush. In other words, the 
procedures that develop—perhaps even rightfully so—in the context of 
aggregate litigation have a tendency to trickle down into other kinds of 
litigation. This is because the judges or rulemakers focus on what they 
know, even when a different situation might be present. For example, 
while the focus on settlement has many origins, at least one of those 
origins is the complexity of aggregate litigation. Judges who see 
settlement working well in complex cases might tend to focus the parties 
on settlement in less complex cases.
233
 The value of settlement is one 
                                                     
230. Id. 
231. See Suzette Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455, 465–518 
(2014) (discussing the impact of these cases on pleading and the negative impact of recent 
procedure changes in areas including class actions, discovery, and summary judgment); Thomas, 
supra note 220, at 992 (arguing for an “atypical doctrine” where “the Court should not make legal 
change motivated by atypical or oddball facts when the change will affect typical cases”); Suja A. 
Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 
215 (2011) (arguing that pleading cases Iqbal and Twombly were “oddball” cases that should not 
have been used to make transsubstantive changes to pleading standards).  
232. See Moore, supra note 57, at 1139. With respect to the Advisory Committee, Moore argues 
that “it failed to observe (explicitly, at least) the dominance of MDL cases when proposing changes 
to the rules: what may be appropriate for an MDL may not be appropriate for a smaller, single 
case.”  
233. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984) (“In fact, most ADR 
advocates make no effort to distinguish between different types of cases or to suggest that ‘the 
gentler arts of reconciliation and accommodation’ might be particularly appropriate for one type of 
case but not for another. They lump all cases together.”); Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting 
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that can be vigorously debated, but there are at least some kinds of 
litigation and litigants who would value a day in court over settlement.
234
 
To the degree that judges cannot see those distinctions, it is problematic 
for the civil litigation system. 
The Court’s interpretation of, and the rulemakers’ drafting of, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure present another trickle-down effect. 
For example, one commentator has argued that the Court’s interpretation 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and its subcategories of class 
action have been misguided.
235
 This is because courts treat Rule 23 
solely as a device for Rule 23(b)(3) or “aggregated-damages” class 
actions, which leads to myopia when interpreting and revising the 
rule.
236
 Courts and the rulemakers appear to fail to consider how changes 
to Rule 23 will affect all aspects of the rule, including the other types of 
class action, such as injunction class actions.
237
 The Supreme Court in 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
238
 for instance, arguably interpreted 
Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement to require a predominance 
analysis in every type of class action, even though predominance is only 
expressly required in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.
239
 In essence, the Court 
interpreted commonality and predominance as if all class actions were 
the same; yet, there are different types of class actions, and they have 
different express requirements.
240
 The Court seemed unmoved by these 
differences, seeing all class action as one monolithic procedural 
                                                     
Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 
691, 692–93 (2006) (“The case management movement, as particularly reflected in the 1969 
Manual for Complex Litigation, prescribed a protracted litigation process divided into various 
segments en route to ultimate resolution not so much by a single-event trial as through such means 
as motions, summary judgments, partial disposition of claims or parties, and settlement at various 
stages.”). 
234. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 233, at 1075 (“Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea 
bargaining: [c]onsent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the 
absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although 
dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done.”). 
235. See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 843 (2016) (arguing that 
interpretations of Rule 23 fail to appreciate the differences between all four of the class action 
mechanisms). 
236. See id. 
237. See id. 
238. 564 U.S. 338, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
239. See id. at 2556. 
240. See Carroll, supra note 235, at 889.  
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device.
241
 Thus, the view of one type of litigation trickles down into 
other kinds of litigation. 
In sum, there are perils to one percent procedure. Whether the 
procedures are by or for the one percent, there are downsides. Cases 
where a procedure might work differently—and in some cases, badly—
go unnoticed and unconsidered because there is a myopic view of 
procedure that is informed and reinforced by a homogeneous group of 
judges, rulemakers, and lawyers. In other words, procedures produced 
by and for those engaged in the most exclusive kinds of litigation simply 
may not work—and in some cases may do direct harm—to the “regular” 
cases that populate federal and state court dockets. In Part II, the Article 
will address the why behind the negative results using social and 
political science as tools. 
II. RETHINKING ONE PERCENT PROCEDURE 
Blockbuster litigation like class actions and MDL capture the 
attention of the public. Similarly, the Supreme Court docket garners a 
great amount of coverage. It is not surprising, then, that this type of 
litigation tends to affect how society collectively thinks about civil suits. 
Yet the attention this litigation gets is outsized; these cases are not the 
most common. 
From September 2013 through September 2014, roughly 18% of the 
civil cases filed were MDL cases.
242
 Class action numbers are more 
difficult to estimate both because many class actions are already 
                                                     
241. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S.  at 375 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court blends Rule 
23(a)(2)’s threshold criterion with the more demanding criteria of Rule 23(b)(3), and thereby 
elevates the (a)(2) inquiry so that it is no longer ‘easily satisfied.’”) (quoting 5 JAMES WM. MOORE 
ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.23[2] (3d ed. 2011).  
242. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 
tbl.C-1 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-1/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/ 
2014/06/30 [https://perma.cc/4P8Z-Z3TP] [hereinafter Table C-1]; ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, tbl.S-20 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/s-20/judicial-business/ 
2014/09/30 [https://perma.cc/CZJ4-T9US] [hereinafter Table S-20]. This is not an exact science 
because the information provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts uses different 
timelines for its statistics regarding civil actions more generally and MDL civil actions. For the 
twelve-month period ending on June 30, 2014, a total of 298,713 civil cases were filed in federal 
district courts. Table C-1, supra. For the twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2014, a total 
of 53,103 civil cases were either transferred to a transferee court under § 1407 (6,120 cases) or were 
originally filed in transferee district courts (46,983 cases). Table S-20, supra. I divided 53,103 (total 
MDL cases filed) by 289,713 (total cases filed) to reach approximately 18%. This percentage 
appears to correspond to other scholars’ estimates as well. See, e.g., Patricia Hatamyar Moore, 
Confronting the Myth of “State Court Class Action Abuses” Through an Understanding of 
Heuristics and a Plea for More Statistics, 82 UMKC L. REV. 133, 175 (2013) (finding that in 2012 
“22% of all pending civil cases were subjected to MDL proceedings.”). 
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captured by the MDL numbers and because the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts does not separately track them.
243
 One study determined 
that 2.4% of federal court civil cases filed in 2012 were class actions.
244
 
Even these statistics may be double-counting, because the data did not 
separate out class actions that were independent of MDL. Giving the 
numbers a generous bent, however, 20% of federal court civil litigation, 
as filed and at most, is aggregate litigation. 
Pending litigation paints a bit of a different picture. Between 
September 2013 and September 2014, approximately 38% of pending 
cases were MDL cases.
245
 That means that more than a third of pending 
cases in the federal civil litigation system were MDL cases. While that 
seems like a large number, there are a couple of important 
considerations. First, the MDL cases tend to occupy the docket for 
longer periods of time, thus explaining the difference between the filing 
and pending rates.
246
 In other words, the cases take up more space on the 
docket once filed, but they are still a smaller number of cases on the 
federal docket when filed. 
Second, a closer look at the kinds of cases reveals that the types of 
cases brought under MDL rules are quite narrow. Nearly 50% of the 
MDL cases pending as of January 2016 were antitrust and products 
                                                     
243. See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 242, at 133 (“In other words, courts in the United States 
offer no data on such basic questions as the number of cases filed as class actions, the percentage of 
cases designated as class actions that are eventually certified as such, or the ultimate disposition of 
such cases.”) (emphasis omitted); Robert J. Herrington, The Numbers Game: Dukes & Concepcion, 
ABA SEC. OF LITIG. (Nov. 20, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/class 
actions/articles/fall2012-1112-numbers-game-dukes-concepcion.html [https://perma.cc/W8XL-
JSKW]. 
244. See Herrington, supra note 243 (estimating that the number of federal court class actions 
filed in 2012 was 6,369). The total number of federal civil cases filed in 2012 was 267,990. ADMIN. 
OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.C-1 (2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-1/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2012/12/31 
[http://perma.cc/WB6M-4WZQ].  
245. The number of cases pending subject to MDL proceedings as of September 30, 2014 was 
127,704. U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2014), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JP 
ML_Statistical%20Analysis%20of%20Multidistrict%20Litigation_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/F5SV-
MGFA]. The total number of pending civil cases during that same time period was 337,302. U.S. 
District Courts–Judicial Business 2014 tbl.3, U.S. CTS. (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2014 [https://perma.cc/U9A6-M6LR]. 
246. Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1202 (2015) (“In addition, changes in the overall median time can be misleading. 
Like the moon’s gravitational pull on the tides, cases consolidated in MDL litigations exert a 
massive influence on terminations and disposition times each year.”). 
05 - Coleman.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2016  5:09 PM 
1048 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1005 
 
liability cases.
247
 The next largest categories of cases were 
“Miscellaneous” at 17%, “Sales Practices” at 12%, and “Securities” at 
8%.
248
 While there is certainly a large number of antitrust and products 
liability cases in the civil justice system overall, the number of cases in 
MDL seems to be overrepresentative.
249
 In addition to underrepresenting 
other types of litigation, MDL also overrepresents corporate defendants. 
Looking at the parties in the cases pending reveals a list of the veritable 
who’s who of corporations, including Time Warner, American Express, 
Aetna, General Motors, Bank of America, Amazon.com, and Ford Motor 
Company.
250
 In other words, this litigation for the one percent indeed 
takes up a great amount of space on the federal civil docket, but it is 
hardly representative of all of the litigation that is filed in federal court. 
It is difficult to determine the exact content of the rest of the litigation 
filed in federal court because the statistics providing the nature of the 
suit do not indicate how many of those cases are filed as class actions or 
MDL. However, looking at the Administrative Office’s nature-of-suit 
statistics provides some sense of what the “other” litigation might be. 
For example, of the cases filed in the twelve-month period ending June 
30, 2014, approximately 16% were cases involving the United States as 
a party, 9% were private contract cases, 11% were private civil rights 
cases, 16% were prisoner litigation (not involving the U.S. as a party), 
about 4% were private intellectual property cases, and 6% were private 
labor cases.
251
 About 25% of the cases were private personal injury 
                                                     
247. See U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT (2016), 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_Type-January-15-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD7L-5UKU]. 
248. See id.  
249. For example, as of June 30, 2015, 15% of the federal district court cases filed were product 
liability and antitrust cases. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.C-2 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-1/statistical-tables-
federal-judiciary/2014/06/30 [https://perma.cc/4P8Z-Z3TP]. This table includes cases that may have 
been or will be transferred into MDL as well, so this percentage might even be slightly overstated. 
250. See id. 
251. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 
tbl.C-3 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-3/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2014/ 
06/30 [https://perma.cc/G4LW-28LK]. The total number of civil cases was 298,713. Id. The total 
number of U.S. civil cases was 46,759; the total number of private contract cases was 26,202; the 
total number of private civil rights cases was 33,277; the total number of prisoner litigation cases 
was 49,015 (16,914 habeas corpus, 141 death penalty, 31,359 conditions and civil rights, and 601 
mandamus and other); the total number of private intellectual property cases was 13,175; and the 
total number of labor cases was 18,272. Id. As an aside, there were 25,346 “All Other” private suits, 
which accounted for roughly 8.5% of all cases. See id.  
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cases, an amount that is likely also reflected in the number of MDL and 
class action cases.
252
 
Thus, the civil docket includes cases involving prisoners, contracts, 
intellectual property, civil rights, and labor. It also involves the United 
States as a party in many cases, whose engagement in different types of 
litigation reflects the private civil litigation picture. In other words, the 
more common civil litigation might be a ho-hum, middle class kind, or it 
might involve a well-resourced employer against an employee, or it 
might be of the poverty-stricken variety like prisoner litigation. The 
picture varies, of course, but the picture is certainly not one that is all 
complex, high-stakes litigation all of the time. 
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the procedural 
doctrine that emerges from the Supreme Court reach beyond the federal 
civil litigation system. About half of the states have adopted the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure verbatim.
253
 However, even in states where the 
Civil Rules have not been formally adopted, at least one study has 
determined that procedural practice in those state courts often lines up 
with federal court practice.
254
 Stated differently, the influence of federal 
practice and procedure reaches far beyond the federal courthouse doors. 
More important, within these state courts—where federal practice and 
procedure is often the bellwether of state practice and procedure—is 
where the vast majority of civil cases in the United States are litigated. 
Approximately fourteen million civil cases were filed in state courts in 
2014,
255
 compared to 303,820 cases in federal courts during the same 
period.
256
 
Yet, as the discussion above shows, one percent litigation drives how 
procedural rules and doctrines are created and reformed. More 
specifically, the individuals and institutions who participate in this one 
percent litigation are deeply invested in how civil litigation works. They 
                                                     
252. See id. The total number of personal injury cases was 75,585 (1,150 marine personal injury; 
3,449 motor vehicle personal injury; and 70,986 “Other” personal injury). Id. The “Other” personal 
injury cases include cases filed in previous years as consolidated cases that were later severed into 
individual cases. Id. at n.2. 
253. Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of 
Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 319 (2001). 
254. Id. at 326–79. 
255. CSP: Court Statistics Project, Civil Cases, 2014, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.ncsc.org/Sitecore/Content/Microsites/PopUp/Home/CSP/CSP_Intro [https://perma.cc/ 
V63D-YQBR]. 
256. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, Civil Filings, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts. 
gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2014 [https://perma.cc/S47X-GPEN]. 
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are necessarily the policymakers—deciding how multidistrict litigation 
will function, controlling the class action, heavily influencing the 
Supreme Court docket, and dictating how the Civil Rules will be 
reformed. 
In this Part, the Article will interrogate why this overall homogeneity 
is problematic. Using both social and political science, the Article 
concludes that while there are some advantages to relying on elite 
experts to decide what rules of procedure should govern civil litigation, 
there are even greater disadvantages to this approach. As with politics 
and economics, a one percent regime—while good for the one percent—
leaves the great ninety-nine percent far behind. 
A. Critique of One Percent Procedure 
In this section, the Article will address how scholarship in social 
science and political science bears on one percent procedure. Providing 
an overview of the critical theories in both of these areas, the Article 
shows how the institutions and players in one percent procedure are 
particularly vulnerable to the pitfalls inherent in group decision-making 
and in legislative processes. 
1. Flawed Decision Making 
Social science studies in group decision-making sheds light on why 
one percent procedure is of concern.
257
 Group decision making is when a 
group of individuals collectively make a choice from a set of alternatives 
they are presented with, thus making the decision attributable to the 
“group” instead of to each individual member. While group decision 
making has its advantages, it can also be problematic. As described in 
Part I, the one percent procedure players are quite homogeneous, sharing 
a legal pedigree and sophisticated experience in complex litigation. This 
expertise is no doubt useful for the areas in which these players practice 
their craft—as either judge, practitioner, or rule maker—but it also has 
its risks. That is because group decision making by like-minded 
individuals does not necessarily lead to optimal results.
258
 There are 
                                                     
257. The academic leader in this area is Irving Janis, whose book Groupthink spawned a great 
deal of work on group decision making and dynamics. IRVING JANIS, GROUPTHINK (1982).  
258. At least one study has shown that “identification and social attraction,” the things that make 
a group homogeneous, diminish the value of group decision making. Michael A. Hogg & Sarah C. 
Hains, Friendship and Group Identification: A New Look at the Role of Cohesiveness in 
Groupthink, EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 28, 337 (1998). This in contrast to friendship, which actually 
appeared to augment how well groups made decisions. Id. This is of interest because the groups 
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many schools of thought on why this kind of group decision making is 
problematic. In this section, the Article will explore a few of the most 
prominent critiques and will provide examples of how these critiques 
manifest in one percent procedure. 
First, group decision making without meaningful dissent is especially 
susceptible to cascade and conformity effects.
259
 Cascade effect arises 
when a few members of a group signal that a decision is correct and the 
other members of the group accordingly fall in line.
260
 These latter group 
members agree even when they might have ethical or analytical reasons 
for otherwise disagreeing.
261
 They might even fall in line due to self-
doubt because the rest of the group is going in one direction or because 
they fear retribution if they were to disagree.
262
 
A specific area where the cascade effect has particular salience is in 
the context of multidistrict litigation and the attorney steering 
committees. There, the lead attorneys have the greatest power, and they 
are deferred to for their expertise. If an attorney in the leadership group 
happens to disagree with the leaders’ approach, she could be taking a 
huge risk in voicing that concern for a variety of reasons. For example, 
she could be viewed as “wrong” by the rest of the group and therefore 
seen as unqualified in future cases.
263
 Or, even if she were correct (or 
perceived as correct), she could nevertheless gain a reputation for being 
contrarian or uncooperative—and risk being left out of the mix for the 
next big multidistrict case.
264
 
Cascade effect also arguably impacts the way the Supreme Court 
selects its cases. Of course the Court is motivated by critical issues of 
law that are in dispute and, thus, need resolution. But the degree to 
which the Court takes certiorari on cases by elite members of the 
Supreme Court Bar also evidences cascade effect. The Court is 
undoubtedly prone to presumptions about the cases that elite members of 
the bar bring. If one of these lawyer’s first cases was meritorious and 
important, the Justices might be more likely to assume that the second, 
                                                     
discussed in this Article are not necessarily friends, but they certainly share many interpersonal and 
identifiable characteristics.  
259. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 10–11 (2003).  
260. Id. at 11. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. As Sunstein explains, “[w]hen cascades occur, the key problem is that the followers are 
failing to disclose or to rely on their private information.” Id.  
263. Id. at 74. This is also referred to as a “reputational cascade,” the idea that “people think that 
they know what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd 
in order to maintain the good opinion of others.” Id. 
264. Burch, supra note 177, at 98. 
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third, and even fourth cases are equally salient without being as skeptical 
as they might be of a case brought by an outsider.
265
 As Justice Kennedy 
stated in reference to the elite Supreme Court Bar: “[t]hey basically are 
just a step ahead of us in identifying the cases that we’ll take a look 
at . . . . They are on the front lines and they apply the same standards [as 
we do].”266 Justice Kennedy’s sentiment profoundly encapsulates the 
degree to which the Supreme Court might be vulnerable to the cascade 
effect in cases brought by the elite Supreme Court Bar.
267
 
A second risk of a homogeneous decision making body is its 
vulnerability to confirmation bias. Confirmation bias occurs when group 
members discount views that are contrary to the group’s view or 
otherwise interpret information in a way that benefits the group’s overall 
perspective.
268
 In other words, members simultaneously disbelieve 
information that is contrary to their worldview and overestimate 
information that is supportive.
269
 This is because they either give the 
information that supports their position more weight or because they can 
simply recall that supportive information more readily.
270
 
Federal civil rulemaking is an example of where confirmation bias 
occurs, most recently with the amendments to the discovery rules to 
include proportionality. As already discussed, the proportionality 
provision is now part of how the scope of discovery is defined under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
271
 Proponents argued that rampant discovery 
abuse within the system required this rule change. Yet, the studies 
conducted in the lead up to this rule change showed, in general, that 
discovery was actually going pretty well in most cases. One study by the 
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) found that the median costs for plaintiffs 
                                                     
265. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 259, at 59 (discussing precedential cascades, which similarly 
involve courts relying on previous court decisions even in the face of new or different information 
that might bear on their decision making).  
266. Biskupic et al., supra note 15. 
267. As noted in Part 1.A.2., selection bias may also be a factor, among others.  
268. Thornburg, supra note 73, at 26. “Confirmation bias leads us to find and interpret 
information in a way that supports pre-existing hypotheses, and to avoid information and 
interpretations that support alternative possibilities.” Id. Thornburg also discusses availability bias, 
an individual bias, which means that “when examples are easy to retrieve from memory, people will 
estimate that the category is large or the event frequent.” Id.  
269. Id.  
270. Id.  
271. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, http://uscode. 
house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title28/title28a/node85/titleV&edition=prelim [https://perma. 
cc/TQP4-D9KA]. 
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were $15,000, and the median costs for defendants were $20,000.
272
 The 
study did not find that discovery is never expensive. To the contrary, a 
related study determined that higher costs are associated with cases 
where the parties have more at stake.
273
 More specifically, for both 
plaintiffs and defendants, the study found a 1% increase in stakes was 
associated with a 0.25% increase in total discovery costs.
274
 In other 
words, the increase in discovery costs was tied to the stakes of the case. 
However, there were other studies that showed that discovery was 
problematic. For example, a survey of corporate counsel by the Institute 
for the Advancement of the American Legal System revealed that 90% 
of the time these counsel believe that discovery costs in federal court are 
not proportional to the value of the case.
275
 
Yet, as scholars have noted, there are reasons to be skeptical of 
normative assessments of discovery costs.
276
 That is because lawyers 
will inevitably fall back on their own “sense” of litigation as a whole, 
which as scholars like Danya Reda have argued, is informed by a “cost-
and-delay narrative.”277 As Reda points out in the exact context of the 
discovery studies, the study design itself demonstrated the degree to 
which one’s own narrative may not be reflective of reality.278 For 
example, the FJC study referenced above reviewed actual cases that had 
been litigated and closed and then asked the attorneys about their 
assessment of that closed case.
279
 The study then asked those same 
                                                     
272. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR. NAT’L, CASE-BASED CIVIL 
RULES SURVEY, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RULES 2 (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F32M-68FJ]. This study surveyed more than 2,000 lawyers (half plaintiff and half 
defense) for its study and looked at all cases terminated in federal court during the fourth quarter of 
2008.  
273. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES: 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RULES (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/ 
Library/FJC,%20Litigation%20Costs%20in%20Civil%20Cases%20%20Multivariate%20Analysis.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9ETN-JUJF].  
274. Id.  
275. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, supra note 23, at 79–80, 83. One study by the American 
College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery found that almost half of the respondents 
“believed that discovery is abused in almost every case, with responses being essentially the same 
for both plaintiff and defense lawyers.” Id. 
276. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies 
and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1107–08 (2012). See also Thomas & Price, supra note 220, at 
1154–55.  
277. Reda, supra note 276, at 1091-102. 
278. Id.  
279. Id. at 1107. 
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attorneys to reflect and estimate discovery costs of discovery in all of 
their cases.
280
 In the actual cases, the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
attorneys estimated that their median costs of discovery and total 
litigation were 20% and 27% respectively.
281
 When it came to those 
same attorneys’ normative assessments of the system overall, their 
estimates increased to 33% and 40% respectively.
282
 In other words, the 
normative assessment exceeded the assessment that was informed by the 
attorneys’ experience in an actual case. 
When the Civil Rules Committee received all of these studies, 
however, it did not pay as much attention to the FJC study’s empirical 
data.
283
 Instead, it paid a great amount of attention to lawyers’ normative 
assessments of the overall system.
284
 Confirmation bias may very well 
be contributing to how the committee works. After all, as discussed in 
Part I, much of the committee membership has experience in complex 
cases.
285
 There, the stakes are higher and, as a result, the discovery costs 
are higher. Even though the FJC study stated that the higher costs were 
due to many variables—namely, the stakes of the case—the committee 
membership did not discuss discovery costs that way. To the contrary, 
the narrative of high discovery costs was confirmed by the experience of 
the larger group. The data was read to support that assumption, and any 
potentially contrary data—like the median cost of discovery study—was 
largely ignored.
286
 
A similar risk of confirmation bias is inherent in settlement 
proceedings in aggregate litigation. The appointment of a homogeneous 
(and repeat-player) group of special masters to monitor and administer 
                                                     
280. Id.  
281. Id. (citing EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR., PRELIMINARY 
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2009)). 
282. Id. 
283. As Reda points out, the Committee ignored four decades of similar findings by other studies. 
Id. at 1111. Reda states, “[n]early every effort to quantify litigation costs and to understand 
discovery practice over the last four decades has reached results similar to the 2009 FJC study.” Id.  
284. Id. 
285. See also Thomas & Price, supra note 220, at 1155. Thomas and Price noted that the “current 
Advisory Committee includes many individuals who . . . have complex litigation experience,” 
including both the practitioners and judges, such that “[f]or many on the Committee, the ‘typical’ 
litigation experience appears to be the atypical case.” Id.  
286. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, supra note 23, at 79–139, 82–83. The Committee used 
surveys of lawyers from the American College of Trial Lawyers (“ACTL”), the ABA Section of 
Litigation, and the National Employment Lawyers Association (“NELA”) to support the need for 
changing the rule rather than considering the findings from the FJC study. See also Thornburg, 
supra note 73, at 27–31 for a discussion of the group and individual decision making dynamics 
involved in the recent discovery amendments.  
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settlement creates this risk. Judges who must then approve, or at the very 
least scrutinize, proposed settlements might necessarily underestimate 
information that runs counter to the settlement and overestimate 
information that supports the settlement. This is, in part, because of the 
familiarity and expertise of the special master, but it is also due to the 
lack of any meaningful dissent to the settlement. Outside of certified 
class actions, there is no real mechanism for creating this potential 
dissent, and thus the danger of confirmation bias is quite pronounced. 
In addition to cascade effect and confirmation bias, a third type of 
concern in group decision making is group polarization. Group 
polarization occurs when a group of homogeneous individuals makes a 
decision as a group that is far more extreme than they all would have 
made otherwise as individuals.
287
 It is when “like-minded people, after 
discussions with their peers, tend to end up thinking a more extreme 
version of what they thought before they started to talk.”288 While 
cascade and group polarization are closely related, the “key difference is 
that group polarization refers to the effects of deliberation, and cascades 
often do not involve discussions at all.”289 
There are multiple explanations for the group polarization effect. The 
first is the “social comparison” theory, which holds that individuals are 
either pressured or enabled to adopt positions that they would not have 
reached on their own.
290
 “Once we hear what others believe, some of us 
will adjust our positions at least slightly in the direction of the dominant 
position, simply in order to be able [to] present ourselves in the way we 
prefer.”291 Second, the persuasive argument theory states that where a 
group has a tendency to hold one position, the arguments then made in 
that group setting overstate the weight of that position.
292
 This is because 
there are no counterarguments to be made. A third explanation is the 
self-categorization theory. This theory states that a member’s own 
awareness of their place in the group makes them work even harder to 
close the gap between their own thoughts and that of the group.
293
 This 
results in a consensus that may actually be more extreme than what the 
                                                     
287. SUNSTEIN, supra note 259, at 11. 
288. Id. at 112. 
289. Id. at 113. 
290. Id. at 122.  
291. Id. 
292. Id. Sunstein argues that this is all about information. Id. at 120–21. “People respond to 
arguments made by other people—and the argument pool in any group with some predisposition in 
one direction will inevitably be skewed toward that predisposition.” Id.  
293. Id. 
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group’s original view might have been because the member’s perception 
of where the group is going and where he sits as an individual guides his 
decision making instead of his objective assessment of the facts.
294
 
Whatever the explanation, group decision making is susceptible to 
group polarization effect, and the one percent players are not immune. 
For example, in the multidistrict litigation context, plaintiffs’ lawyers in 
leadership positions may not be willing to dissent even when they have 
reasons to do so. This is likely because of the social comparison theory. 
Lawyers who seek leadership positions in future multidistrict litigation 
cases are exactly the kind of individuals who might be subject to this 
effect. In social comparison theory, people tend to focus on what the 
group collectively knows and believes, and to disregard different 
perspectives or new information.
295
 Group members may do so because 
they fear “group rejection” or they want “general approval.”296 “Group 
members who care about one another’s approval or who depend upon 
one another for material or nonmaterial benefits will suppress highly 
relevant information.”297 Lawyers might not share their concerns about a 
current litigation strategy with the group because they fear it will inhibit 
their chances at a leadership position the next time around. This might 
lead the group to adopt a suboptimal settlement or strategy. 
Other aspects of multidistrict litigation are similarly susceptible. The 
JPML is a small and closely knit group of judges who serve for seven-
year terms. They may feel social pressure to impress one another for 
future types of service. As already discussed, they are prone to favoring 
each other, as evidenced by the appointment of their own panel members 
as transferee judges such as the appointment of Judge Breyer to the VW 
litigation over other non-JPML district judges.
298
 
                                                     
294. Id. See also James H. Davis, Introduction to the Special Issue on Group Decision Making, 
52 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 1–2 (1992). Group polarization 
has also been described as an explanation of something called the “choice shift” effect. James H. 
Davis, Some Compelling Intuitions About Group Consensus Decisions, Theoretical and Empirical 
Research, and Interpersonal Aggregation Phenomena: Selected Examples, 1950–1990, 52 ORG. 
BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 3, 10 (1992). “However, it is difficult to discern which is 
the chicken and which is the egg. Do individuals change positions as a result of discussion . . . ? 
Does a group reach consensus on other grounds, such as a minority yielding to a majority?” Id. at 
12.  Cass Sunstein discusses similar effects: ideological amplification and ideological dampening. 
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 259, at 4. In each respective case, being in a group with like-minded or 
differently-minded individuals will either amplify or dampen ideological preferences. Id.  
295. SUNSTEIN, supra note 259, at 123. 
296. Id.  
297. Id.  
298. See infra Part I. See also Williams & George, supra note 170. 
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Members of the civil rulemaking body are also institutional actors 
who appear to be vulnerable to group polarization. As discussed earlier, 
this group is quite homogeneous. The few potential dissenters—such as 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys or the Democratic-appointed judges—no doubt 
experience the social comparison effects of group decision making. They 
have concerns about their reputation and an interest in being seen as 
team players. Moreover, these “dissenters” are not really that different 
from the rest of the committee because they share a complex, high-
stakes litigation experience. Due to the group polarization, the Civil 
Rules Committee is also susceptible to developing an “us versus them” 
attitude about some of their proposals. “If members of the group think 
that they have a shared identity and a high degree of solidarity, there will 
be heightened polarization.”299 This means that the group is also less 
likely to hear critiques from groups that they view as “other.”300 The 
recent discovery amendment process showed that the civil rulemaking 
body adopts this approach. The alleged predictability of plaintiffs 
disputing the proposals and defendants supporting it motivated, to a 
large degree, the committee to disregard the comments altogether.
301
 
In spite of the risks, group decision making is not an absolute 
negative. There is a certain amount of cohesiveness that these effects 
achieve, and that cohesiveness allows for groups to function civilly and 
effectively.
302
 Yet, the downside of these effects cannot be denied. The 
challenge is to acknowledge that these effects are, in fact, possible and 
then create mechanisms to counter the negative impacts while 
augmenting the positive. 
2. Imperfect Decisions 
The creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and how they are 
used and interpreted is a product of a series of decisions made by 
rulemakers, lawyers, and judges. Like all decisions, these are often 
imperfect ones. One reason may be that the structure for such decision 
                                                     
299. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 42 (Oxford 
University Press 2009).  
300. Id. “[P]eople are less likely to shift if the direction advocated is being pushed by unfriendly 
group members or by members who are in some sense ‘different.’” Id.  
301. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, April 2014, supra note 286, at 80. The comments were 
identified as “reflecting pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant views, divided sharply between strong 
opposition and strong support.” Id. The proposals were also said to have “drawn widespread protest 
by those who commonly represent plaintiffs, and widespread support by those who commonly 
represent defendants.” Id. at 116.  
302. SUNSTEIN, supra note 259, at 12. 
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making encourages the most heavily-resourced and interested parties to 
bring their weight to bear. Relatedly, the costs of these decisions are not 
born by this narrow group of actors, but are instead spread across a large 
swathe of actual and potential litigants. Social science theories on 
lawmaking and regulation help to explain why the Civil Rules—and how 
those rules are used and interpreted—are particularly susceptible to 
imperfect decision making. 
James Q. Wilson developed a well-known four-quadrant typology of 
law-making and regulation, which demonstrated that the viability of a 
law depended on the distribution of costs and benefits.
303
 He theorized 
four types of laws based on these potential distributions: “majoritarian 
politics” (diffuse benefits and costs), “client politics” (diffuse costs and 
concentrated benefits), “entrepreneurial politics” (concentrated costs and 
diffuse benefits); and “interest-group politics” (concentrated costs and 
benefits).
304
 According to Wilson, the laws in the category of 
entrepreneurial politics are very difficult to pass.
305
 The costs are 
concentrated, and the incentives for a counter-movement are quite 
strong.
306
 In contrast, the laws in the majoritarian and interest-group 
politics categories were easier than entrepreneurial laws.
307
 In 
majoritarian politics, laws with costs and benefits widely distributed 
would ultimately depend on political will, so if the political will was 
                                                     
303. THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357–94 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). Most of this literature 
focuses on agency regulation and democratic politics and has developed into the public choice 
theory. “Public Choice [is] the economic study of nonmarket decisionmaking or simply the 
application of economics to political science.” Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 878 (1987) (quoting DENNIS C. MUELLER, 
PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979)). See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative 
Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 99 (1983) (“[W]idely dispersed costs or benefits are less effectively 
represented in policymaking than concentrated costs or benefits. Thus we would expect error-
correction to favor interests championed by enforcers and regulated firms and to undervalue 
interests of unorganized beneficiaries of government programs.”); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. 
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 890–901, 906 (1987) 
(concluding that the influence of special interest groups is overstated, but quite real); Jonathan R. 
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest 
Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229–33 (1986) (“Because the benefits of such legislation are 
spread among everyone in the population, individual members of the public lack sufficient 
incentives to promote public interest laws since all the costs of such promotion must be absorbed by 
the promoters themselves.”).  
304. Id. at 367–72. 
305. Id. at 370. 
306. Id. An example of successful entrepreneurial politics includes Ralph Nader and The Auto 
Safety Act of 1966. Id.  
307. See id. at 367–68. 
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strong, the law would pass.
308
 If not, then there would be no new law. 
With interest-group politics, Wilson theorized that with both 
concentrated costs and benefits, each side of a particular issue had the 
same incentive to organize, leaving much of the rest of the populace out 
of the equation.
309
 This meant these kinds of laws would only pass in 
cases where the legislature was most amenable.
310
 
The easiest of laws to pass, however, is the client politics category. 
There, the diffuse costs of the law mean broader constituents are less 
motivated to organize against it while the concentrated benefits mean 
that a narrow group of individuals have strong incentives to see the law 
through. Because the costs of the change are spread across a broad 
group, the resistance to the change is diluted.
311
 Yet, the incentives for 
those who stood to benefit were quite high because that benefit would be 
concentrated on them.
312
 As Wilson explains, “[s]ome small, easily 
organized group will benefit and thus has a powerful incentive to 
organize and lobby; the costs of the benefit are distributed at a low per 
capita rate over a large number of people, and hence they have little 
incentive to organize in opposition—if, indeed, they even hear of the 
policy.”313 
Wilson’s examples of client politics laws included what he referred to 
as “less conspicuous regulatory programs, such as state laws that license 
(and protect) occupations[,]” as well as instances “where the government 
is supplying a cash subsidy to an industry or occupation.”314 This theory, 
though not a perfect fit, can be adapted to demonstrate how procedure is 
developing in civil litigation today.
315
 While these changes are not taking 
place purely legislatively, the framework still works when applied across 
the areas this Article discusses—aggregate litigation, Supreme Court 
                                                     
308. See id. at 368. Wilson cites the Sherman Antitrust Act as an example of this kind of law. Id. 
at 367.  
309. Id. at 368. Wilson cites labor legislation as examples of this kind of law.  
310. See id. 
311. Id. at 369. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. 
314. Id.  
315. See, e.g., Patrick Luff, Captured Legislatures and Public-Interested Courts, 2013 UTAH L. 
REV. 519, 548 (2013) (arguing that “the factors suggesting private-interest capture of the judiciary 
are unconvincing”); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the 
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10–11 
(1990) (limiting the usefulness of public choice theory and other social science methods). 
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practice, and the federal civil rulemaking process.
316
 Civil procedure is 
important to those that are paying attention, but it does not garner 
attention to the degree that many substantive legal developments do. 
Indeed, it is an area that, while not completely veiled, is less prominently 
considered by the public. In this way, procedure is much like Wilson’s 
client politics laws. It is “less conspicuous”317 than other legal topics; 
those who stand to gain the most are behind, and receive the 
concentrated benefits of, many procedural developments, while the rest 
of the civil litigation system and its players are together bearing the 
diffuse costs. 
A salient critique of client politics is that it allows for normatively bad 
legislation to be passed simply because it is easiest to do so.
318
 This 
leads to legislation that serves a well-resourced minority at the expense 
of a less-resourced majority.
319
 That is because “smaller groups with 
aligned preferences (industry and trade groups, for example) are better 
able to organize than diffuse groups (the general public)” and thus are 
better “able to exert disproportionate influence on [policymakers].”320 
There are certainly many critiques of the public choice theory of politics 
that are largely beyond the scope of this Article.
321
 The point of using 
the theory here is to create yet another access point for considering 
whether the way procedure develops is optimal. When this lens is used, 
it demonstrates that many recent procedural developments are for the 
benefit of the few. 
For example, the Civil Rules Committee discovery reform agenda has 
been pushed by individuals who are heavily involved in high-stakes 
litigation. As previously discussed, the lawyers who sit on the committee 
have unique complex litigation experience, with many further 
representing business interests in practice.
322
 Further, the judges who sit 
on the committee have a conservative ideological bent, having been 
                                                     
316. The federal civil rulemaking process has some legislative or administrative law flavor, but it 
is not legislative in the purest sense of the word. See infra Part II. 
317. THE POLITICS OF REGULATION, supra note 303, at 369. 
318. Susan Block-Lieb, Congress’ Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of 
Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 838 (1997). 
319. See id. at 837–38. 
320. Luff, supra note 315, at 529. 
321. One such critique is that it is sometimes in the public interest for a minority to obtain 
legislation that benefits it. Block-Lieb, supra note 318, at 837. The argument is that when non-
monetary costs and benefits are accounted for, it is indeed in the public interest for this type of 
legislation, in some cases, to pass. Id.  
322. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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mostly appointed by a Republican president.
323
 What this means is that 
these individuals are inherently more attuned to, and more concerned 
about, what they see as high discovery costs. Cognitive biases aside, the 
reality of the rulemaking process is that the individuals sitting on the 
committee have a fundamental interest in lowering discovery costs both 
because of their own litigation experiences and also because the 
individuals and institutions who have access to the committee—and the 
power to organize as well—are also likeminded. There were influential 
groups and individuals who opposed the discovery amendments, such as 
the Center for Constitutional Litigation and various well-known 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.324 Yet, their firepower pales in comparison to 
organizations like the Chamber of Commerce and DRI—The Voice of 
the Defense Bar—or general counsel’s offices from Microsoft, Bayer, 
and GlaxoSmithKline.
325
 Moreover, as already discussed, the institutions 
that are helping to draft and execute the rules are equally in a 
concentrated-benefit stance. The Duke Center for Judicial Studies is but 
one example of how those who have high-stakes litigation experience 
are concentrating their efforts toward achieving reform that will most 
benefit them. 
Civil rulemaking is an obvious example because it is quasi-legislative. 
But it is not the only example of how concentrated benefits and diffuse 
costs give rise to one percent procedure. The experience of judges and 
litigants in aggregate litigation is also subject to this effect. The 
experience in that litigation has led many to consider settlement as the 
most viable option. Such complex litigation, it is argued, is more easily 
resolved without adjudication.
326
 This ethos around settlement has 
transformed all of civil litigation, however. The goal of judges is often 
not to adjudicate, but to manage the litigation toward settlement.
327
 Thus, 
                                                     
323. Id. 
324. See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 57, at 1140–44; CCL Files Comments Opposing Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, CTR. FOR CONST. LITIG. (February 18, 2014), 
http://www.cclfirm.com/blog/12283/ [https://perma.cc/TA5U-42NA]. 
325. Id.  See also ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, supra note 23, at 181, 224.   
326. Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS 
L.J. 9, 41 (1996) (discussing in detail the public policy for supporting settlements and criticizing the 
Supreme Court’s failure to consider these policies in three specific cases). 
327. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77 (1982) (discussing how 
judges often manage cases toward settlement); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case 
Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981) 
(discussing how Rule 16 and other changes to the Civil Rules provide opportunities for judges to 
manage cases toward settlement). It is not just settlement for the sake of settlement that is troubling. 
Indeed, the focus on settlement takes the focus off of merits discovery for the purpose of trial. This 
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when judges who have more experience with such complex cases either 
end up on rulemaking bodies or even just addressing cases in their own 
chambers, it is easy to see how they begin to focus on settlement as the 
objective. 
Similarly, the advent of the Supreme Court Bar exemplifies client 
politics in practice. A small minority of individuals and entities has 
access to the elite Supreme Court Bar, and they are using that advantage 
to influence the Supreme Court’s agenda. The issues in which they have 
the greatest interest are then litigated at that level, while issues that may 
be of interest to the rest of the population are not. Again, it is not as if 
the lawyer seeking certiorari is the only deciding factor dictating what 
cases the Supreme Court hears. But it is another example of how a small 
percentage of individuals and entities have heightened access to one 
critical fulcrum of how procedure develops. This is demonstrated in 
cases like Twombly and Iqbal, two cases that arguably heightened 
pleading standards; J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro,
328
 a case that 
made it easier for large corporations to have a national customer base 
without subjecting the company to any such national personal 
jurisdiction; and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
329
 and DirectTV, 
Inc. v. Imburgia,
330
 two cases that have solidified the validity of the class 
action waiver in arbitration agreements. These are some examples of 
how the procedure agenda of the Supreme Court has benefited a 
concentrated group of litigants while putting a diffuse group of litigants 
in a lesser position. Yet, that larger group of litigants is so diffuse that it 
does not otherwise have the incentive (or resources) to engage the 
Supreme Court and what civil procedure cases it hears. 
In other words, many of the ways in which procedural rules and 
doctrine develop—through Supreme Court litigation, through doyen 
litigation like MDL, or through the civil rulemaking process—adhere to 
a client politics model. The result is that a minority of the players in civil 
litigation—the one percent—dictate the rules for the rest. Yet, these 
rules are not optimal because they do not account for much of the 
litigation that makes up our civil litigation system. 
One of Wilson’s goals in critiquing the regulatory state using 
categories, including client politics, was not to necessarily put an end to 
that kind of regulation, but instead to focus on how those regulations 
                                                     
means that the parties’ positions going into settlement might be negatively affected because they 
were unable to get the discovery necessary to augment their bargaining position.  
328. 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
329. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
330. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
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came to be.
331
 By understanding the politics and economics behind a 
law, we can better structure the system so that the benefits are 
maintained, but the negatives are lessened. As Wilson argued, “ideas” 
are important, and they largely influence how any system works.
332
 
Thus, when members of a decision making body share all of the same 
ideas, the system works as such. Yet, when members of that same body 
come to the table with different ideas, the resulting system is altered. 
As will be discussed in the next Part, changing how procedural reform 
occurs will go a long way toward dulling the negative effects of a one 
percent regime, while still allowing for the benefits of such expertise to 
remain. 
B. Procedure for the Ninety-Nine Percent 
The individuals responsible for how procedure develops are the most 
elite among us. Their expertise and experience is undoubtedly a benefit 
to the civil litigation system as a whole. These individuals are, after all, 
some of the best and the brightest. Yet, there are inherent costs in 
leaving policy making to such a homogeneous group of individuals. 
They necessarily have blind spots, are subject to various biases, and, as a 
consequence, are not capable of producing an optimal set of procedures 
and doctrines to govern a civil litigation system that is far more varied 
than their experience. These frailties in the current one percent 
procedure regime are demonstrated by the social science that 
interrogates group decision making and by the political science theories 
around regulatory lawmaking.
333
 Thus, knowing that the current one 
percent procedural regime has some benefits but also suffers from some 
critical weaknesses, the question then becomes how to reform the system 
to make it better. In this section, the Article will elaborate on how to 
achieve this heterogeneity by proposing specific reforms tailored to 
maintain the benefits of expertise bestowed in a one percent procedure 
regime, but also meant to distribute more of the benefit to the vast 
ninety-nine percent. 
1. Redressing By-the-One-Percent Procedure 
In order to address the negative impact of one percent procedure, 
structural changes to the institutions responsible for creating procedural 
                                                     
331. THE POLITICS OF REGULATION, supra note 303, 391–93. 
332. Id. at 393–94.  
333. See Part II infra. 
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doctrine are required. As the previous section demonstrated, the 
homogeneity that dominates these institutions leads to flawed decision 
making and suboptimal decisions. There is no complete panacea for this 
problem; as with many complex problems, the proffered solutions are 
neither satisfying nor complete. Yet, there are some structural 
modifications that would at least begin to right the procedural machine 
back toward the ninety-nine percent by requiring more heterogeneity in 
the decision making bodies and the decision making process. 
More specifically, in the context of federal civil rulemaking, there are 
a number of changes that could be implemented. One suggestion is to 
take the appointment power away from the Chief Justice. Scholars have 
argued that the Chief Justice’s ideology and agenda necessarily infects 
the kind of appointments that he makes.
334
 There is nothing in the Rules 
Enabling Act that requires the Chief Justice make the appointments, so it 
is possible to change this custom. Instead of the Chief, perhaps the 
Judicial Conference or some combination of the Justices, the Judicial 
Conference, and representative litigation groups could make the 
appointments instead.
335
 
If the appointment process must remain with the Chief, another option 
would be to require more diversity on the Committee and to enforce the 
self-stated term limits. When Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act 
in 1988, the House version of the bill required that the rules committees 
have a “balanced cross section of bench and bar, and trial and appellate 
judges.”336 No one seemed to outwardly dislike this language, yet the 
final version of the bill did not retain the “balanced cross section” 
language.
337
 It might be time to resurrect the ethos of this language and 
require greater balance among the committee members, not just in terms 
of ideological perspective, but also in terms of the kind of litigation that 
they practice.
338
 For example, Elizabeth Cabraser is the sole plaintiffs’ 
                                                     
334. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 57, at 1087.  
335. James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Appointment of Inferior Officers, and the “Court of 
Law” Requirement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1178–79 (2013) (noting that the Chief makes 
appointments in other contexts where perhaps a “collegial designation process” would be more 
appropriate).  
336. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, pt.1, at 3 (1988). 
337. Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 
1662 (1995). 
338. Coleman, supra note 45, at 293–97 (discussing various proposals for restructuring federal 
civil rulemaking); Jeffrey Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of 
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 637 (2001) (“On a longer term, but perhaps more elusive level, 
policymakers should consider fine-tuning the generally wise Rules Enabling Act process to ensure 
that the various committees are more evenly balanced in socio-political makeup.”).  
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attorney on the current Civil Rules Committee, which in itself is a 
problem. Compounding the problem, however, is the fact that Cabraser 
practices the one percent litigation this Article discusses: she is one of 
the most successful complex litigation lawyers in the world. Thus, in 
addition to increasing the presence of plaintiffs’ attorneys, a better 
structure would also ensure that lawyers with small to mid-size practices 
served on the committee as well. This would encourage the Committee 
to focus on how changes might impact lower-stakes litigation. In 
addition to requiring this diversity, the Chief Justice could also be 
required to articulate the reasons for his appointments—an account of 
why he chose a particular person and what her qualifications are.
339
 
Doing so would increase the transparency regarding who is chosen to 
serve on the committees and would also give the public a sense of what 
qualifications are viewed as critical to such appointments. 
For the elite Supreme Court Bar, the solutions are harder to imagine. 
After all, the best and the brightest come through the ranks of law school 
and into judicial clerkships that then feed the Supreme Court clerkship, 
which then lead to prestigious opportunities like the Solicitor General’s 
office. Changing the nature of the individuals coming through these 
pipelines is the most obvious solution, but that requires changes to the 
way law students and clerks are accepted and mentored. Moreover, to a 
large degree, the composition of the Bench itself has to change—or 
become more enlightened—in order to allow for a more diverse 
population to obtain clerkships and opportunities. Thus, the changes 
necessary to equalize the influence of the Supreme Court Bar might 
require a different approach than simply changing the Bar’s 
composition. 
As already discussed, the elite Supreme Court Bar has a great deal of 
influence in the kind of cases that the Court takes. This is true in the 
context of procedure, as the Court continues to take cases and make 
decisions intended to stem the tide of out-of-control litigation. Yet, the 
litigation that the Court is looking at in those cases is not as common as 
the everyday litigation in federal court. There are at least two ways to 
minimize the effect of one percent influence in this context. 
One way is to somehow focus the Court on how its procedure 
decisions are skewing the civil litigation system for the vast majority of 
                                                     
339. See Maxwell Palmer, Does the Chief Justice Make Partisan Appointments to Special Courts 
and Panels?, 13 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 153, 166 (2016) (suggesting that “[i]f the Chief Justice is 
concerned about this appearance of partisanship, the solution is easy and obvious: the Chief Justice 
could release a simple statement explaining the qualifications of his appointees and the basis for his 
choices, just as the president does when appointing judges.”).   
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cases. So, for example, when the Court was deciding cases like Twombly 
and Iqbal, perhaps there was a way to focus the Court on how changes in 
pleading that might have made sense in a large antitrust case might make 
less sense in the mine run of cases. This may take the form of dedicated 
and respected amici that the Court would look to for this kind of 
discussion. Or, perhaps the Court could ask the parties to devote some 
amount of their argument to the effect that changes in the rules would 
have on the entire system. One critique of the Court is that it is hostile to 
litigation and, to some degree, out of touch with how litigation really 
functions.
340
 Many of the Justices never practiced at the trial-court level, 
nor did they sit as a District Court judge. In order to counter the Court’s 
trial court blind spot, an educational program might serve a good 
purpose. The point here is not to argue that the Court should come up 
with rules specific to each kind of litigation that exists in our system 
today, but to argue that making policy decisions with a blind eye to those 
other forms of litigation is not going to result in the best policy overall. 
A second way in which the one percent effect of the Supreme Court 
Bar might be lessened is to change how much access and influence 
members of this bar have. As already discussed, figuring out how to 
better diversify such an elite group of lawyers is no small task. The 
problem of homogeneity starts in the education system, seeps up through 
law school, and continues with biased mentorship and opportunities. To 
be sure, the composition of the bar is slowly shifting, but again, there is 
great value placed on expertise in law practice and the most elite and 
influential type of law practice necessarily includes one percent 
litigation. However, there are still ways to dull the influence, even if the 
elite Supreme Court Bar comes from and continues to represent a certain 
type of practice. Private funding could create opportunities by building 
on the law school models of Supreme Court litigation at places like 
Stanford Law School. Perhaps there are private individuals who would 
fund a specialized practice providing greater Supreme Court access to 
                                                     
340. See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation As an 
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006) (“[O]ne 
cannot understand the Rehnquist Court’s complicated intellectual matrix without taking account of 
its profound hostility toward the institution of litigation and its concomitant skepticism as to the 
ability of litigation to function as a mechanism for organizing social relations and collectively 
administering justice”); Brooke Coleman, Civil-izing Federalism, 89 TUL. L. REV. 307, 310–11 
(2014) (arguing that in procedural cases, some individual Justices’ hostile views of civil litigation 
are better predictors of their position than their alleged commitments to federalism); Benjamin H. 
Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appointment Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1137, 1139 (2012) (finding in an empirical study of the Roberts Court that the “Justices have less 
courtroom experience (as lawyers or trial judges) than prior Justices”). 
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the ninety-nine percent litigants. Another approach might be to require 
members of the elite Supreme Court Bar to take on a certain amount of 
pro bono cases. A final idea might be to publicly fund lawyers who are 
performing at this level so that they can take on cases without 
demanding a high price from their clients. Given the resistance to 
funding legal aid, this final suggestion seems the least unlikely of an 
already unlikely cast of characters. However, the bottom line is that with 
awareness that the elite Supreme Court Bar appears to have 
disproportionate influence and access, some structural changes must be 
made to ensure the integrity of that elevated influence and access. 
The influence of one percent players in the construction of procedure 
is out of line with the kind of litigation that makes up our civil justice 
system. In other words, the procedures created by the one percent are a 
disservice to the remaining ninety-nine. In order to mitigate the amount 
of influence exercised by the most elite litigation and its participants, 
structures like the federal civil rulemaking process and the Supreme 
Court Bar must be reexamined and reformed. The changes suggested in 
this Part are certainly not the only answers, but they go a long way 
towards righting the system. 
2. Righting For-the-One-Percent Procedure 
In addition to the procedures created by the one percent, there are also 
procedures such as multidistrict litigation that are largely created for the 
one percent. As already discussed, these systems suffer similar frailties 
in their decision making. Thus, like the procedures by the one percent, 
the simple answer in the for-the-one-percent category is to create greater 
heterogeneity within these powerful institutions. The details of this 
simple answer prove to be a bit more elusive. 
Elizabeth Burch has effectively probed multidistrict litigation and its 
structure.
341
 Burch studied the homogeneity of the lawyers who litigate 
multidistrict cases and argued for a number of reforms, including 
allowing for outsiders to more readily object and dissent from lead 
plaintiffs’ lawyers actions, as well as appointing a more representative 
group of attorneys to actually lead the case.
342
 Burch also suggested 
reforming how attorneys’ fee awards are calculated.343 She argued for a 
quantum-meruit theory of fee awards that would allow judges to tailor 
                                                     
341. See Burch, supra note 177. 
342. Id. at 120–23. 
343. Id. at 128–38.  
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the fees to the actual benefit the lawyers obtained for their clients.
344
 
Burch’s reforms get to the heart of the one-percent problem at the micro-
level of multidistrict practice. Her suggested structure requires more 
heterogeneity among decision makers, fosters dissent, and rewards 
participants for the work they actually do. 
These changes would then mitigate the potential downfalls inherent 
when group decision making is done by a homogeneous group. As one 
scholar has argued, “[i]f big rewards come to those who conform, bad 
cascades will increase, simply because the incentive to be correct is 
strengthened or replaced by the incentive to do what others do.”345 Yet, 
these changes also balance the benefit of expertise in this context. It 
would be a mistake to vary the composition of these lawyer groups so 
much that such expertise is lost. Instead, solutions must bring more 
diversity without sacrificing the benefits of repeat players. Other 
solutions might include a requirement that for each MDL, a new entrant 
be appointed to the plaintiffs’ steering committee. These types of 
changes would allow voices into the process so that they could gain the 
experience without sacrificing the efficiencies and benefits of having 
experienced lawyers running the litigation. These kinds of changes to the 
structure of multidistrict litigation, including those suggested by Burch, 
would go a long way toward combatting the negative effects of 
homogeneity in the context of multidistrict litigation. 
Additional changes might include more frequent turnover on the 
JPML membership. That body chooses whether to consolidate cases and 
decides to where they should be transferred. Those decisions are heady 
ones and a seven-year term may be too long to allow for the kind of 
heterogeneity of opinions that would lead to better decision making. The 
Chief Justice also makes these appointments. As discussed in the 
previous section, the JPML is another area where perhaps a different 
selection process and decision maker is worth considering. Even without 
these changes, there is some evidence that diversity in the JPML changes 
results. As discussed, Judge Vance recently became the first female 
chairwoman of the Panel. Under her leadership, the consolidation grant 
rate decreased to 40%, making this the first year that the panel denied 
more motions than it granted.
346
 It could be that greater diversity in 
                                                     
344. Id. at 128–29. 
345. SUNSTEIN, supra note 259, at 76.  
346. U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS 6-7 (2015), 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6424-ATUF].   
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terms of leadership and membership is already affecting the JPML’s 
practices. 
Finally, the increasing appointment of special masters in these 
complex cases should be examined. The concern is that repeat-player 
special masters might be more concerned about their reputations as 
settlement-makers and less concerned about making sure the settlement 
process is fair to all involved.
347
 One way to combat this instinct is to 
change the structure around special master involvement in settlement by 
making all interactions on the record or by requiring more judicial 
oversight and involvement in the settlement process.
348
 
Beyond changes to the internal functioning of these procedures, there 
is the lingering question of how these one percent procedures impact 
other kinds of litigation. That is, we must understand how this kind of 
litigation influences the development of procedure overall. Judges who 
oversee many of these kinds of cases must somehow keep in mind that 
there are other types of cases on their docket. When they develop case 
law specific to aggregate litigation and multidistrict litigation, they must 
endeavor to keep it there.
349
 Moreover, when lawyers who practice 
primarily in these areas have the opportunity to effect policy in civil 
litigation, those lawyers must also be aware that there are other types of 
civil litigation. We can educate judges and lawyers and hope that they 
can be aware of their own biases and blind spots. But the reality is that 
education and self-awareness only go so far. The deeper answer is to 
introduce more heterogeneity into the elite bench and bar—to make 
space for lawyers and judges with different kinds of experiences to 
influence how procedure develops. Given that specialization in the 
practice of law is here to stay, the chance of changing the lawyer 
population is unlikely. But judges can certainly be more varied, and 
perhaps there are ways to appoint judges with more variety of legal 
experiences, such that even if they come to handle a number of complex 
cases, their prior experience will balance that bias. Judges have a great 
deal of power when it comes to defining the contours of civil 
procedure—the Civil Rules provide judges with discretion and the 
interpretation of procedural doctrine depends on policy decisions that the 
                                                     
347. Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. 
J. 235, 266 (1997). 
348. See Brazil, supra note 200, at 421–22.  
349. See, e.g., Thomas, How Atypical, supra note 231, at 992 (arguing that the Court should 
adopt an “atypical doctrine”).  
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judge must make.
350
 While it may be difficult to insulate judges from the 
political pressures that are becoming all too familiar in modern times, 
varying the actual experience of our bench may go a long way toward 
balancing the way procedure is implemented. 
This leads to a final point. It may be that heterogeneity is not enough. 
The civil litigation system may, like our economic system, be too 
different in its extremes. Thus, no matter how much diversity one 
introduces into these structures, it may not change the fact that complex 
litigation is distinct from other kinds of litigation. If high-stakes 
litigation is so different in kind, then it may be time to question the 
transsubstantive nature of our system of procedure—the idea that all 
civil cases are governed by one set of rules.
351
 Much has been written 
about the pros and cons of transsubstantive procedure, and this Article 
does not want to duplicate that effort.
352
 Setting aside the benefits or 
disadvantages of a transsubstantive system, this Article has 
demonstrated that there is indeed a one percent problem. If the structural 
changes suggested will not eradicate those challenges, then all that is left 
is to accept the one percent system as it is and attempt to create separate 
rules for the separate systems.
353
 Whatever the solution, however, one 
                                                     
350. Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 
JUDICATURE 109, 120 (2009) (“The Federal Rules necessarily confer substantial discretion on 
Article III judges. The discretion they confer entails the power to make policy choices that, although 
they may be buried in the obscurity of technical language, are increasingly likely to be exposed by 
those who have come to recognize the power of procedure, often in recent years aided by systematic 
empirical data.”). 
351. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 370 (2013) (“For 
example, consideration should be given to abandoning the transsubstantive principle requiring that 
the Federal Rules be ‘general’ and applicable to all cases—a notion that supposedly is embedded in 
the Rules Enabling Act.”). 
352. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 
OKLA. L. REV. 319, 324, 333–34 (2008) (advocating against transsubstantivity as an “independent 
value” of the Federal Rules); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil 
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (1989) (“[U]niformity and 
trans-substantivity . . . are a sham.”); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-
Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 373 (2010) (discussing the 
history and precarious existence of transsubstantivity). 
353. Miller, supra note 351, at 371 (arguing that serious consideration should be given to the idea 
of “putting cases on different litigation tracks and devising different procedures that are deemed 
appropriate for the characteristics of the cases posted to each track”); Richard McMillan, Jr. & 
David B. Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 431 (1985) (proposing a formal fast-track litigation for certain disputes); 
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the 
“One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 377, 398–405 (2010) (proposing a simple 
track for cases involving low-value disputes).  
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percent procedure will not go away on its own. It is something that we 
must address. 
CONCLUSION 
Much like the need to bridge the economic gap between the one and 
ninety-nine percent, the civil procedure system governing all of federal 
civil litigation must similarly be rethought. Procedures designed for the 
one percent and by the one percent fail to account for the average 
litigation that occurs in federal civil court. This is because the 
individuals responsible for creating this procedure are too deeply steeped 
in high-stakes, complex litigation. Both social and political science 
provide evidence that decision making by such homogeneous actors 
often creates a suboptimal product. Indeed, the one percent procedure we 
have today is not doing right by the ninety-nine percent, as demonstrated 
by the recent discovery amendments and the influence of multidistrict 
litigation. The structures that create one percent procedure must be 
reconsidered. More heterogeneity within the institutions that create 
federal civil procedure would go a long way toward ensuring that the 
federal civil litigation system is governed by a set of rules meant for 
more than just the one percent. 
 
